Divide and Rule中国对欧盟“分而治之”

Divide and Rule中国对欧盟“分而治之”

09.06.2018 15:07

Divide and Rule
China attracts Eastern European countries with the promise of financing much needed infrastructure investments. The EU needs to find a common response.
Author: Jan Gaspers(Head of Research of the European China Policy Unit at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin)
2018.03.02
分而治之
中国正通过对基础设施投资提供资金来吸引东欧国家,对此欧盟需要有一个共同的立场。
作者:Jan Gaspers(柏林墨卡托中国研究中心,欧中政策研究部负责人)
翻译:Chaoting Cheng


China’s intense political engagement with the CEEC poses a growing challenge to the EU, and requires not only a cohesive strategy from Brussels, but also the biggest EU member states to revisit their China policies. Otherwise, they risk further tilting the EU-China balance of power in Beijing’s favor.
中国在中东欧国家密集的政治介入正造成一个对欧盟不断增长的挑战,不但布鲁塞尔需要为此拿出一个紧密的战略,而且欧盟最强大的成员国也要重新审视他们的中国政策。否则,欧中权力平衡向北京倾斜的风险将进一步加大。

Aside from the lures of potentially growing Chinese investments, 16+1 has been highly attractive for Central and Eastern European leaders, as it promises to upgrade their countries’ political standings with Beijing—and by extension the rest of the EU and even the United States.
姑且不谈不断增长的中国投资带来的诱惑,16+1对中东欧国家领导人也是高度有吸引力的,因为它许诺提高中东欧国家在与北京交往中的政治地位,由此可以影响欧盟其它成员国甚至美国。

In February 2017, the European Commission opened a formal investigation into the flagship BRI construction project in Europe, a €2.45 billion high-speed rail link between Belgrade and Budapest. Brussels has expressed doubts about the financial viability of the project and its compliance with EU public procurement rules. Overall, Chinese loans for large-scale infrastructure remain rather unattractive in light of existing EU financing, such as the EU’s structural cohesion funds, the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), and the Trans European Transport Networks (TEN-T), which tend to come as partial grants.
在2017年2月,欧盟委员会启动了对一个“一带一路”欧洲项目的正式调查,即投资达24.5亿欧元的连接贝尔格莱德和布达佩斯的高速铁路项目。对这个项目的融资能力及对欧盟公共采购规则的遵从性,布鲁塞尔表示怀疑。总体上来说,相较于目前的欧盟融资机制(比如“欧盟结构化基金”、“欧洲战略投资基金”和“泛欧运输网络”,它们也对大规模基础建设提供部分资金支持),中国贷款仍然不够有吸引力。

However, even if China’s infrastructure financing and investments in Central and Eastern Europe were to significantly expand in the years ahead, this would only create another set of fundamental challenges for CEEC economies, since a key rationale underpinning China’s economic engagement is opening up local and Western European markets to Chinese products and services. Already, the CEEC trade relationship with China is characterized by massive trade imbalances. The countries having attracted the most Chinese investment to date also have some of the biggest trade deficits.
然而,在接下来数年时间,即便中国在中东欧国家的基础设施融资和投资显著扩张,这也只会给中东欧国家经济造成一系列基本挑战,因为中国经济介入的关键出发点是打开中东欧和西欧国家市场大门,以便输出中国产品和服务。中东欧国家与中国的贸易关系已经存在巨大的失衡。目前这些吸引了大部分中国投资的国家也是一些最大的贸易逆差国。

Driving Breaks
Despite the sobering economic realities, political elites in some CEEC states cling to cooperation with Beijing. They actively position closer ties with China as a counter-narrative to European cooperation and the liberal values underpinning the European project. In a clear reference to the EU, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán remarked at the Budapest 16+1 Summit: “We see the Chinese president’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative as a new form of globalization that does not divide the world into teachers and students but is based on common respect and common advantages.” And in May 2017, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić declared: “There are no problems in our economic and political relations, we are always on the same side, and when China has something to say, we are always on the side of China.”
尽管经济现实让人清醒,但中东欧国家的政治精英却迷恋于与北京合作。他们积极与北京建立更紧密的联系,作为对欧洲合作及基于自由价值观的欧洲项目的平衡。匈牙利总理奥尔班就在布达佩斯举行的“16+1”峰会上对欧盟明白地说,“我们将中国国家主席的‘一带一路’倡议视为一种新形式的全球化,不再把世界分成教师爷和学生,而是基于互相尊重和共同优势。” 塞尔维亚总统Vučić也在2017年5月宣称,“我们(与中国)的经济和政治关系没有问题,我们总是站在同一边,并且当中国要表达意见的时候,我们总是站在中国一边。”

As China seeks to expand its political footprint, the political damage to the European Union is already visible. For some time now, the EU has been unable to act cohesively towards China on what have been trademarks of EU foreign policy, namely upholding the international rule of law and protecting human rights. In March 2017, Hungary derailed the EU’s consensus, refusing to sign a joint letter denouncing the reported torture of detained lawyers. In June 2017, Greece—a 16+1 observer and major beneficiary of Chinese investment in recent years—blocked an EU statement at the UN Human Rights Council criticizing China’s human rights record. This marked the first time the EU had failed to make a joint statement at the UN’s top human rights body. Similar instances of CEEC blocking EU statements on China have occurred since.
当中国试图扩张其政治足迹的时候,对欧盟的政治损害就可以预见了。一段时间以来,欧盟已经在一些重大外交政策问题上不能协调一致面对中国,比如维持国际法治和保护人权。在2017年3月,匈牙利不顾欧盟共识,拒绝签署一项谴责待被拘禁律师的共同声明。在2017年6月,希腊作为“16+1”的观察员和近年来中国投资的主要受益国,阻挠了一项在联合国人权委员会上批评中国人权纪录的欧盟声明。这是欧盟首次未能在联合国最高人权机构上发表联合声明。此外还有其它中东欧国家阻挠欧盟关于中国声明的事例。

Current discussions in Brussels about creating a European investment screening mechanism, which is geared initially at Chinese strategic investments in European high-tech industries, will become a litmus test for the EU’s ability to act decisively on China. Chinese investments have already prompted individual 16+1 EU members to challenge the current proposal. Opposition is also building up among EU accession countries with sizable Chinese investments. Even if the EU manages to adopt the mechanism by summer 2018—as is currently envisaged by the biggest member states—this will not help overcome what is already a central theme in European China policy-making: a growing lack of trust between the Eastern and the Western member states.
布鲁塞尔目前正在讨论建立一个欧洲投资审查机制,最初是适用于中国对欧洲高技术产业的战略投资。这个机制将是检验欧盟是否具备对中国采取决定性行动能力的试金石。中国的投资已经导致个别欧盟成员挑战目前的欧盟计划。在申请加入欧盟而且有着相当多中国投资的国家,也出现了反对意见。即使欧盟能够在2018年夏季之前采用这套机制 – 正如欧盟几个大国所设想的,也不会有助于消除欧盟中国政策制定的一个中心问题:东欧成员国和西欧成员国之间日益缺乏信任。

High Time for a Response
In light of these developments, Brussels has set up a working group to develop a European narrative and strategy for engaging with China’s BRI and its economic offensive in the EU and its neighborhood. An internal EU strategy paper is due to be released this year. Key recommendations are already clear: the European Commission should actively close infrastructure financing gaps that China would otherwise seek to fill, earmarking European resources from the structural cohesion funds. EU member states also need to make sure that the post-Brexit 2020 EU budget will not result in a significant reduction of funding for the CEEC and thus a greater opening for China.
是做出回应的时候了
鉴于目前的形势发展,布鲁塞尔已经建立了一个工作组来制定欧洲的表述和战略,以应对中国的“一带一路”及其在欧盟内部和邻国发动的经济攻势。预计本年底欧盟将发布一份内部战略报告。关键性的建议已经清晰起来:欧洲委员会应当积极行动以消除基础设施融资的不足,否则中国将试图填补。欧盟成员国还需要确保,在2020年英国退欧后的欧盟预算不要大幅减少对中东欧国家的资金支持,那将会导致对中国更加大门洞开。

At the same time, the EU will need to implement more modest measures to align BRI investments in its neighborhood with European interests. These include enabling third countries to properly evaluate, monitor, and prepare large-scale infrastructure projects, including those financed by China. To protect and promote EU norms and standards in the neighborhood, the development policy apparatus of European institutions and EU member states need to support related capacity-building.
与此同时,欧盟需要采取更多温和的措施,以促成中国“一带一路”在欧盟邻国的投资与欧洲利益保持一致。这些措施要使得第三方国家能够恰当地评估、监控和准备大规模的基础设施项目,包括那些由中国提供融资支持的项目。为在欧盟邻国保护和促进欧盟的规范和标准,欧洲的发展政策机构和欧盟成员国需要支持相关的能力建设。

The EU also needs to leverage institutional frameworks that can help to promote greater convergence of EU investment priorities and principles and Chinese investment activities. This includes channeling as much Chinese infrastructure investment as possible through multilateral frameworks like the EU-China Connectivity Platform and the largely Western-styled Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as through co-financing models involving Chinese institutions and the EIB and EBRD.
欧盟还需要运用其机构制度框架,它们能帮助促进欧盟投资优先级及原则与中国投资活动更大程度的融合。这包括尽可能引导中国基础设施投资通过多边框架(比如“欧中连接平台”和很大程度上西方式的“亚洲基础设施投资银行”)、以及通过引入中国机构和EIB、EBRD等机构参与的联合融资模式来进行。

As China plays to deep political divisions within Europe, it will not be sufficient for bigger EU member states to appeal to Central and Eastern Europeans’ “European sentiment” when dealing with China. Besides strengthening EU solidarity across the board and fighting the rise of populist governments across Europe, France, Germany, and Italy should expand their policy coordination on economic engagement with China to also include Poland. Among the 16+1, Warsaw has chosen to pursue a soberer approach towards Beijing, and therefore might seem susceptible to greater EU engagement on China.
当中国玩弄花招来深化欧洲内部分歧时,对欧盟的较大成员国来说,仅仅诉诸于中东欧国家的“欧洲情节”来对付中国是不够的。除了强化欧盟跨越边界的团结和与在法国、德国、意大利及整个欧洲崛起的民粹主义势力斗争外,在与中国经济交往方面,欧盟大国还应加强政策协调,而且还应纳入波兰。在“16+1”中,波兰对北京选择采取一种较为清醒的方式,因此可能比较容易接受欧盟对中国进行更大程度的约束。

Calling on China to pursue a “One Europe” policy, as German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel did in August 2017, and encouraging CEEC to close the ranks also implies that bigger EU member states need to consider their own hypocrisy. As long as Berlin and Paris pursue their own interests in their relationships with China, they will struggle to convince the CEEC not to use the 16+1 for similar ends. Germany and France should deploy their privileged relationships with China to serve wider European interests. Both Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron have recently pointed out how important it was for European companies to get better access to the Chinese market. They also warned about the risks of state-driven Chinese takeovers of European hi-tech companies.
呼吁中国奉行“一个欧洲”政策,正如德国前外长Sigmar Gabriel在2017年8月所称,以及鼓励中东欧国家抛开(与中国的)等级差异,也暗示了欧盟大国的伪善一面。只要柏林和巴黎在处理与中国关系中追求自身利益,那么说服中东欧国家不要参与“16+1”就是一件费力的差事。德国和法国应当运用他们与中国有更重要关系这一点,来服务于更广泛的欧洲利益。默克尔和马克龙最近都指出,对欧洲的企业来说,获得对中国市场的更好准入是多么地重要。对于中国国家驱动的、对欧洲高技术企业进行并购的风险,他们也提出了警告。

CEEC governments, however, do not consider these issues priorities. They hope that Chinese investment will give their economies a push, and that closer relations with Beijing will increase their political influence. It is up to Germany and France to initiate a debate within the EU to find a compromise for Europe’s policy vis-à-vis China that takes everybody’s interests into account.
然而,中东欧国家的政府,却并不考虑这些问题的高优先级。他们希望中国投资将给他们的经济注入活力,并且建立与北京更密切的关系将提升其政治影响力。现在是取决于德国和法国的时候,在欧盟内部发起一场辩论,以在对华政策方面达成妥协,该政策应考虑到所有各方的利益。


Source:
https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/divide-and-rule/

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  • Erstellt von topofworld In der Kategorie Politik政治 am 09.06.2018 15:07:00 Uhr

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