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    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog Eintrag 美中对抗与德国站队 - 谁将赢得新时代的军备竞赛(5G)? kommentiert 07.03.2019

      外交部:
      德国外交部似乎并不在乎中国是德国最大贸易伙伴以及中德战略伙伴关系这一现实,与内政部态度接近。外交部一位发言人强调,华为是一家中国企业,受中国法律管辖,对中国企业有义务与中国情报机构合作表示担忧 。

      德国总理:
      作为德国政府首脑,默克尔一向对重大问题出言谨慎,尤其是对于在美中两个世界最强大国之间选边站这样的敏感问题。2019年2月5日,默克尔在访问日本期间表示,“鉴于安全方面的考虑,必须与中国政府讨论,(中国的)公司不能将数据交给(中国的)国家机构。 ”这相当于为华为公司参与德国5G网络建设设置了条件。不能不说,默克尔是一个老练的政客,她施展了一种“战略模糊”的手腕,避免明确选边站队,同时也考虑到美中双方的诉求。当然也可以认为,她是在为最终的选边站队争取时间。

      除了通讯运营商、德国工业界和德国政府这几个利益攸关者,还必须考虑到德国是一个民主国家,公众意见往往对政府决策有重大影响,而德国媒体对中国的报道以负面居多,不能忽略这一点。

      中国是德国最大的贸易伙伴,德国企业在中国市场有巨大的投资和经济利益,德中两国已经建立起全面深入的伙伴关系。而且,作为一个中等大国,德国并无在地缘政治上与中国对抗的雄心和意志,也缺乏这样的能力。但是,美国是德国的传统盟国和强大的安全保护提供者,美方的强硬要求,使得德国政府面临一个棘手难题。德国政府最终如何决策,目前仍不得而知,但是可以确定的是,德国政府将不会迅速做出决策,而是将审时度势,寻找符合德国利益的最佳平衡点。甚至有人认为,鉴于此事关系重大,不能仅仅由德国政府来决策,而应该由德国国会来最终拍板 。

      4. 美国能否拉起打击华为的统一战线?

      尽管美国花了很大力气来游说盟国和其它国家不要使用华为的网络设备,但是成果有限。目前只有澳大利亚、新西兰和日本三国政府明确表示会将华为从5G网络建设排除 。但是新西兰总理Jacinda Ardern却在2019年2月19日表示,还没有就在5G网络中是否使用中国华为公司的设备做最后的决定 。因此,迄今为止,真正坚定追随美国的只有澳大利亚和日本两国。

      这些迹象显示,这一次美国可能难以成功组建打击华为的统一战线。有欧洲评论家认为,Trump总统破坏了欧美之间的信任关系,使得欧洲在中美之间的选择中陷入困境,不愿意押宝任何一方。目前欧洲会对华为采取防范措施,尤其是在核心网选择上排除华为,但并不情愿在整个5G网络建设上明确排除华为。当然,欧洲也清楚,华为并非完全不可取代,对华为的限制也许有利于欧洲本土通讯设备供应商:瑞典爱立信、芬兰诺基亚和法国阿尔卡特尔。

      如果说美中对抗即将来临,那么与冷战1.0时的一呼百应相比,这一次美国组建联盟、控制盟国和支配世界的能力似乎在下降。2015年3月,作为美国最亲密的盟国,英国不惜激怒美国,加入由中国主导的“亚洲基础设施投资开发银行”,就清楚地表明了这一点。英国与其它中等大国一样,不再仅仅依靠美国,而是在美国和中国之间两面下注。对于英国来说,这是一个生死攸关的问题。英国经济的重心在于服务业,尤其是金融服务业,如果英国不能服务于一个崛起中国的金融和经济利益,那么英国将在二十一世纪被边缘化。实际上,除了与中国合作,英国并没有多少选择 。

      美国的其它欧洲盟友,也并不情愿在对华关系中为了服从美国战略需要而牺牲自己的商业利益。与冷战1.0时期令人生畏的苏联红军相比,中国日益增长的军事力量并不构成对西欧的直接威胁。中国在意识形态上也并不像前苏联那样咄咄逼人,宣称要“埋葬资本主义制度”。如果美国打算全方位遏制围堵中国,那么将难以获得冷战1.0时期西欧盟国的完全认同。当然,美国也可能对此并不十分在意。对美国来说,遏制中国的最重要伙伴在亚太地区,日本、韩国和台湾的重要性要远远高于西欧。而由日本提出、得到澳大利亚和印度支持、并最终被美国接纳的“印太战略”将成为遏制中国的主要地缘政治战略;由美日澳印四国组成的“民主安全菱形”,将很可能作为一个多边军事联盟承担类似于北约在安全事务上对抗苏联的功能。而且,即便以法德为核心的“老欧洲”不服美国号令,美国还可以在“新欧洲”(中东欧国家)找到更顺从的伙伴。

      凭借依然超强的实力和尚存的领导力信用,也许美国还可以勉力组建一个遏华统一战线,但是这个集团的内部团结却相当可疑。在冷战1.0时期,东方集团爆发了中苏分裂,中国转而投靠美国,是对苏联领导力的战略性重击;同样地,在西方集团内部,法国戴高乐总统推行独立自主的外交政策、建设独立的核力量并退出北约军事一体化机构,法国的离经叛道让美国头疼不已。即便是忠实的西德,勃兰特政府也力主推行与东方集团缓和的“新东方政策”,展示了西德的独立性。2003年,美国执意发动入侵伊拉克的战争,但法德公然坚决反对。同样地,在2015年,英法德也不惜触怒美国而加入了中国主导成立的亚投行。所以,美国即使能够成功组建遏制中国的统一战线,也并不能保证成员国完全服从美国意志;而美国的理念,也不允许美国如同冷战1.0时期的苏联那样,悍然以武力镇压匈牙利(1956年)和捷克斯洛伐克(1968年)的独立自主行为。

      不过,在有关中国的问题上,德国能否顶住美国压力,不屈从美国意志,也要打一个很大的问号。1989年事件后,欧美实施对华军售禁运。多年来,中国一直努力说服欧盟解除这个禁运。德国总理施罗德在任时支持中国的要求,与法国一起大力推动解除欧盟对华军售禁运,但由于遭到美国强烈反对,最终作罢。今天的华为问题,某种意义上与中国要求欧盟解除对华军售禁运问题颇为类似。虽然在军售问题上,德法与美国冲突的激烈程度远逊于2003年反对美国攻打伊拉克,但德法仍然屈从了美国意志,由此可见,那时中国在德法心中的分量甚至不如伊拉克。

      5 冷战2.0的序幕?

      1946年3月5日,丘吉尔在美国总统杜鲁门的陪同下,在美国发表了著名的“铁幕”演说,对他眼中严重而紧急的苏联扩张主义威胁提出警告。丘吉尔的演说被广泛认为是开启冷战的关键时刻。而美国副总统Mike Pence于2018年10月在哈德逊研究所发表的对华强硬演说,也被很多人士认为是冷战2.0的动员令,可以与丘吉尔那篇开启冷战1.0的演说相提并论。如果说美国与中国正在步入一场新冷战,那么这一次将与旧冷战显著不同。前苏联当年主要是凭借强大的军事力量与西方分庭抗礼,并对西欧造成了直接的军事威胁;而且,东方阵营的共产主义和西方阵营的自由民主主义也展开意识形态上的激烈对抗。但是,中国的崛起主要在于经济和科技的快速发展,民众生活水平得到显著的提高,这反过来构成了中国共产党执政合法性的重要和主要来源;另一个来源是民族主义,但民族主义历来是把危险的双刃剑,中国的执政者必须小心翼翼地运用这股力量。因此,如果美国要发动对华新冷战,那么,打击中国的经济和科技实力将是主要作战方向,军事力量和意识形态的对抗将退居次要地位;但是,如果美中两国不能很好地管控冲突,那么在经济和科技上的较量也不排除升级为军事力量和意识形态的全面对抗。

      在这个大背景下,被视为中国崛起缩影的华为公司,同时也是中国科技进步和经济发展的杰出代表,成为美国的首要打击对象,是美中对抗合乎逻辑的发展。

      在丘吉尔发表“铁幕”演说一年后,1947年3月,美国总统杜鲁门在国会发表演说,后被称为“杜鲁门主义”。根据“杜鲁门主义”,美国将“支持那些抵抗武装少数派和外部势力压迫的自由人民,而这应成为美国外交政策的基石。”杜鲁门宣布,美国愿意向深陷(与希腊共产党)内战的希腊政府提供经济和军事援助。土耳其面临与希腊类似的局面,也应获得美国援助。杜鲁门主义意味着美国终结与苏联的战时联盟,标志着冷战的实质性开端,由此美国开始为其遏制苏联政策提供财政手段。与之类似的是,美国副总统Pence的对华强硬演说可能是一场舆论动员,此后不久即展开了对华为的全面打击,标志着对华新冷战进入实际操作阶段。此前对中兴公司的打击行动可以被认为是一次战略预演,结果大获成功,中方全盘接受了美国要求,甚至包括向中兴派驻美方检查人员并承担费用这样“丧权辱国”的要求。打击中兴行动的成功,很可能鼓舞了美国打击华为的信心。

      美中贸易战是美国为了打击中国经济实力而主动发动的,很难说中国方面情愿参与这场可能葬送国运的冲突。但是,中方近年来的急于求成和战略冒进却让自身不自觉地掉入了美方挖掘的“修昔底德陷阱”。中国过早抛弃邓小平的韬光养晦战略令人困惑,因为这必将使得美中摊牌提前到来,从而大大不利于羽翼未丰的中国。

      6 结语

      美国国家机构对中国民族骄傲华为公司的全面打击,触动了美中对抗的敏感神经,美中两强似乎正在加速掉入“修昔底德陷阱”,由此引发了全球各地铺天盖地的讨论和忐忑不安的关注。美国拘捕华为公司高管的行动,以及随后要求各国禁止华为参与对未来至关重要的5G网络建设,不仅仅是一个法律问题,也是一个技术问题,还是一个地缘经济问题,最终是一个地缘政治问题。只有在这个大背景之下,才能理解为何超级大国美国对一家中国企业深具戒心并大动干戈。自冷战结束以来,世界格局发生了深刻的变动,国际力量对比发生了重大的转移。美国朝野上下逐渐达成了共识,中国就是那个有能力挑战美国霸权的战略竞争者,而且是排在传统对手俄国之前的头号竞争者。美国不会无视战略天平继续向中国倾斜,在Trump总统治下,美国必将采取坚决果断而又不拘常理的行动,以确保美国在世界秩序和格局中继续拥有领袖和支配地位。

      面临数十年未有之变局,大多数国家都无法置身事外。在这场是否允许华为参与5G建设的风波中,德国处于风口浪尖,面临选边站队的艰难抉择。德国的决定,将具有重大的示范效应,整个欧洲都在观望德国。但是,德国将不会迅速做出选择,而是将谨慎地审时度势,通盘考虑各方态度立场,反复权衡利弊得失,从而最终做出有利于德国利益的决策。

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog Eintrag 美中对抗与德国站队 - 谁将赢得新时代的军备竞赛(5G)? kommentiert 07.03.2019

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      VOA (2019). The prime minister of New Zealand said there was still no final decision on using Huawei products新西兰总理称仍未最后决定是否使用华为网络设备. Available at: https://www.voachinese.com/a/new-zealand...19/4794149.html (accessed March 6, 2019).

      WSJ (2010). Security Fears Kill Chinese Bid in U.S.. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240...596611547810220 (accessed March 6, 2019).


    • 1. Introduction

      Huawei is widely regarded as China's most outstanding, powerful, and most aggressive ICT (Information Communication Technology) company. It has been committed to entering the U.S. market. However, contrary to its outstanding performance in other markets, Huawei has long failed to achieve a major breakthrough in the U.S. market. This is so because the state apparatus of the U.S. has prevented American customers from purchasing Huawei's products, solutions, and services on the grounds of national security. In 2018, the U.S. launched its strongest ever actions against Huawei. In December 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice ordered the arrest of Huawei's CFO Meng Wanzhou on the grounds that the company was suspected of violating US sanctions against Iran, and asked Canada to extradite Meng to the United States for trial. At the same time, the United States decided to ban Huawei from participating in the construction of the 5G network of strategic importance. A lot of signs indicate that the U.S. state apparatus has made the crackdown on this successful technology company—which is seen as the epitome of China's rise—an important strategic goal, and is sparing no effort to mobilize its traditional and emerging allies to join its ranks.

      In stark contrast to the frosty reception and restriction in the U.S. market, Germany has been quite welcoming for Huawei's investment and business activities. Huawei also places special emphasis on the German market, and its Western European headquarters is located in a western German city, Düsseldorf. This is not only because of Germany's leading market size in Europe, but also because as a major developed country Germany's acceptance and recognition has an extraordinary demonstration effect for Huawei's business development in the global market. Over the years, Huawei has continued to invest a lot of resources in Germany, and its market share continues to increase. Germany is so important for Huawei that Torsten Küpper, head of Public Relations of Huawei Germany, called Germany the “second hometown” of Huawei (MA REVIEW, 2016).

      However, as Germany's most powerful ally and security provider since the end of World War II, the United States urged Germany to follow Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to join its international action against Huawei and to ban Huawei from participating in construction of the 5G network. Hence, Germany faces a difficult decision to choose between the two most powerful countries of the world: the United States and China.

      This article is not intended to predict how Germany will take sides, but to systematically analyze the similarities and differences between Germany and the United States in terms of position and policy towards Huawei, the opinions of different German stakeholders, the determinants of German decision-making, as well as the impacts of German decision on Sino-German relations and the changing world order.

      2. Huawei in the U.S. and the U.S. policy towards Huawei

      2.1. Huawei's development in the United States

      The United States is the world's leading communications equipment market with a market capacity of US$83.22 billion in 2016 (GRAND VIEW RESEARCH, 2018) and is expected to reach US$125.1 billion by 2025 (PR Newswire, 2018). Therefore, breaking through the U.S. market has a decisive strategic significance for ambitious Huawei.

      As early as in 1999, Huawei opened a research institute in Dallas to develop products specifically for the U.S. market. In June 2001, Huawei established FutureWei, a wholly-owned subsidiary in Texas, to begin selling broadband and data products to local businesses.

      As Huawei advanced in the U.S. market, doubts about Huawei's products came to the fore. In early 2003, Cisco sued Huawei in a court in Texas for infringement of its intellectual property rights. After one year and a half of patent disputes, the two sides finally reached a settlement. However, this dispute seriously affected Huawei's reputation in the U.S. market, making Huawei's business progress very slow (Jiemian, 2017).

      In 2007, Huawei and the U.S. mobile operator LeapWireless reached a mutual agreement - a first for Huawei. Thereafter, Huawei began to make some market progress. However, Huawei mainly provided services to some small and medium-sized operators, and has been unable to enter in league with the four major communication operators in the U.S. market (Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile) (Jiemian, 2017).

      After 2008, Huawei tried to adopt a merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy to promote its business development in the United States, but Huawei's M&A attempts were repeatedly blocked. The landmark events are as follows (CKGSB, 2017):

      Three attempts of M&A were rejected
      -In 2008, together with Bain Capital, Huawei attempted to acquire 3Com and was rejected by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS);
      -Huawei’s attempt to acquire Motorola’s wireless assets in 2010 was also rejected by the U.S. government;
      -In 2010, Huawei attempted to acquire 2Wire, a broadband network software vendor, but failed because it was unable to obtain approval.

      A purchase of patent was rejected
      -In 2010, Huawei acquired 3Leaf's patented technology for US$2 million, but this deal was once again considered by CFIUS as “threat to U.S. national security”. Huawei finally revoked the transaction in February 2011.

      In addition to the failures of M&A, Huawei's contracts for supplying 4G equipment with AT&T (in 2009) and Sprint (in 2010) were also rejected by intervention of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) (USCC, 2011) and the U.S. Department of Commerce (WSJ, 2010).

      In October 2012, after more than one year of investigations on Huawei and ZTE, the U.S. House Intelligence Committee issued a report accusing the two largest Chinese telecommunications equipment companies of being arms of the Chinese government that had stolen intellectual property from American companies and could potentially spy on Americans. The House Intelligence Committee came to the conclusion that Huawei and ZTE were a national security threat because of their attempts to extract sensitive information from American companies and their loyalties to the Chinese government. Therefore, the United States government was asked to not do business with Huawei and ZTE and American companies were recommended to avoid buying their equipment (NY Times, 2012).

      After the report of the House of Representatives, the network equipment market of U.S. telecommunications operators was closed for Huawei. But Huawei still tried to sell mobile phones and other terminal products in the United States. However, this too was also strongly restricted. In January 2018, at the urging of U.S. lawmakers, AT&T, a large US telecommunications operator, cancelled its Smartphone deals with Huawei. The reason behind this was the concern that Huawei “will pose a threat to U.S. national security” (REUTERS, 2018).

      In March 2018, according to the suggestion of CFIUS, U.S. President Donald Trump blocked Singaporean Broadcom's hostile takeover bid worth of US$117 billion of Qualcomm, a well-known American communications chip and wireless technology company. The reason was that CFIUS is worried that successful acquisition by Broadcom will lead to possible reduction of R&D investment in Qualcomm, which will indirectly benefit Qualcomm's Chinese competitor Huawei—thereby jeopardizing the“national security” of the U.S. (Bloomberg, 2018). The Trump Administration is extremely concerned that Huawei as a Chinese company could gain technological superiority and dominance over the United States, especially in the field of 5G mobile communications—which is regarded as the battlefield of the new era of arms race by the U.S. government. Compared with previous U.S. Administrations, the Trump Administration's restrictions against Huawei have increased.

      Along with the U.S. government, the U.S. Congress is also alert to the operations of the two Chinese ICT companies, Huawei and ZTE. Following the 2012 House Intelligence Committee report, the Senate's 2019 John S. McCain Defense Authorization Act, passed on July 22, 2018, explicitly forbade the U.S. federal government to purchase any equipment or services from Huawei or ZTE .

      2.2. U.S. launched actions against Huawei

      In early December 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a warrant for the arrest of Huawei's CFO Meng Wanzhou on the grounds of suspected violation of the U.S. sanctions against Iran. The U.S. also asked Canada to extradite Meng to the United States for trial. Moreover, according to a New York Times report on February 12, 2019, President Trump will issue an executive order to prohibit U.S. telecommunications operators from using Chinese equipment in the construction of next-generation wireless networks (NY Times, 2019a), thereby excluding Huawei and ZTE—especially Huawei, which is a leading technology company in 5G field—from 5G network rollout in the U.S. market. At the same time, the U.S. government launched high-profile international action against Huawei, demanding that the international community, especially American allies, follow the United States and ban Huawei from participating in the construction of 5G networks. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo even warned that the United States will not be able to partner or share information with countries using Huawei equipment (REUTERS, 2019). This is obviously a strong signal asking countries to choose between the United States and China.

      Rome was not build in a day. The United States' restrictions against China's leading ICT companies, Huawei and ZTE—especially against Huawei, which is more powerful—have been long in the making in treating them as threats to “national security”. Concrete policies and measures to prevent and restrict them are also being implemented. In this regard, both Republicans and Democrats, both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the federal government have reached a consensus.

      2.3. Analysis and Interpretation of U.S. actions against Huawei

      The U.S. arrest of Huawei's CFO and a series of strong actions against Huawei are not just legal and network security technology issues, but also geo-economic issues related to economic and technological competition. In other words, this is a geopolitical issue.

      Legal perspective
      It cannot be denied that the United States has also punished many American and other countries' companies violating U.S. sanctions, but it is extremely rare to directly arrest company executives (Project Syndicate, 2018). In the view of Huawei's founder Ren Zhengfei (Meng Zhouzhou is also his daughter), the purpose of the U.S. move is to achieve the biggest hit on Huawei (Sina, 2019). Taking making business with Iran as a basis for punishment might be justified from a legal perspective, but it is very suspicious politically. Even if it is legally justified, there is still a possibility of “selective” law enforcement. As an article published in Forbes magazine pointed out, many U.S. companies trade all the time with Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. They just do so through intermediaries (Forbes, 2018). Moreover, the legal basis for supporting this arrest—“long arm jurisdiction”—is not a rule of international law. Many countries believe that it seriously violates the principle of international law that “a country should not exercise state power in the territory of another country”, therefore they do not recognize the validity of its jurisdiction. In the eyes of Beijing, the U.S. is exercising its state power to suppress a Chinese company regarded as a source of national pride in China: the substance of the issue is that the U.S. is using legal means to replace fair market competition.

      Network security perspective
      Given the strategic importance of 5G infrastructure, the U.S. government places great emphasis on cyber security. In order to address concerns about China's rapidly increasing influence on the global communications supply chain, the National Security Council has had the idea of building a “nationalized” national 5G network by the state rather than private operators so as to strengthen control over the network (Bode, 2018). Although this plan has not been implemented, considering that the United States has a liberal tradition of "small government, big market" and has always avoided excessive involvement of the state in economic affairs, the U.S. government's unprecedented emphasis on 5G network security should by no means be underestimated.

      For Huawei, entering the markets of developed countries like the United States and Western Europe is of particular importance. On the one hand, the huge size of the U.S. and European markets is very attractive for Huawei—which is extremely focused on business expansion. If Huawei's products and solutions are recognized by highly demanding European and American customers, this will have a great demonstration effect for other countries. Therefore, Huawei often invests a lot of resources at all costs and does not miss any opportunity to enter the European and American markets. In 2010, in order to address the British government's concerns about the safety of Huawei products, Huawei and UK's highest-level intelligence department, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), jointly established Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre, which is responsible for conducting the safety assessment of Huawei's products deployed in the UK market. On February 21, 2019, the Financial Times reported that Ciaran Martin, Director of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) under GCHQ, said he was confident that the UK network security authority will be able to control any risk posed by Huawei even if the British government allowed it to participate in the construction of a 5G network. In a speech in Brussels, Martin said that although US intelligence agencies raised concerns about espionage and disruption, he believed that strict controls and supervision could offset the risks (Financial Times, 2019).

      The United Kingdom is a close ally of the United States, and the NCSC has had many years of practical experience in assessing the safety of Huawei products. Therefore, the conclusions of the UK cyber security authority are quite weighty, indicating that security concerns about Huawei's products can, at least, be technically addressed. Although the United States has always suspected that Huawei's products have a "back door" which could be used by the Chinese government and military to engage in espionage, this has never been proved. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that the debate on security issues around Huawei is only a purely technical issue.

      Geo-economic competition over 5G technologies
      The Trump Administration believes that the world is engaged in a new arms race. Although this is a competition involving technology, not conventional weapons, it poses an equally significant threat to U.S. national security. In an era in which the most powerful weapons are controlled by computer networks, any country which dominates 5G technology will have economic, intelligence, and military advantages throughout this century. The United States has lagged behind Europe and China in the eras of 3G and 4G, and Huawei's overall lead in 5G technologies has further worried the United States. Therefore, the United States is determined to take all possible measures to block Huawei in order not to lose in this vital competition (NY Times, 2019b).

      According to Jeffrey Sachs, a professor at Columbia University, “Quite transparently, the U.S. action against Meng is really part of the Trump Administration's broader attempt to undermine China's economy by imposing tariffs, closing Western markets to Chinese high-technology exports, and blocking Chinese purchases of US and European technology companies. One can say, without exaggeration, that this is part of an economic war on China, and a reckless one at that. America’s motivations in this economic war are partly commercial—to protect and favor laggard US companies—and partly geopolitical. They certainly have nothing to do with upholding the international rule of law. The Trump Administration, not Huawei or China, is today's greatest threat to the international rule of law, and therefore to global peace (Project Syndicate, 2018)."

      Economic development is fundamentally driven by innovation. Although the United States still has overall advantages, China is catching up quickly in all directions. In some areas, such as 5G, China is even ahead of the U.S. For the U.S., loss of technological dominance is unacceptable and it is determined to use all its means to defend its innovation advantages. In the Sino-American trade war, the real interests of the United States lie in not just reducing its trade deficit towards China. Since a large part Chinese exports actually come from American companies, the trade deficit is actually not the root cause of the trade war and China's gains are not as large as the numbers indicate. If the goal is only to reduce the trade deficit, then China is actually willing to make concessions and the negotiations should have reached an agreement. The real purpose of the United States is to stop the advancement of China's high-tech industry (BBC, 2019a).

      Geopolitical competition and ideological confrontation between the U.S. and China
      In fact, Huawei's huge market share in Europe shows that it is widely accepted in Western countries. However, the key issue is that Huawei is a Chinese company. William R. Evanina, the Director of U.S National Counterintelligence and Security Center, said, “It's important to remember that Chinese company relationships with the Chinese government are not like private sector company relationships with governments in the West. China's National Intelligence Law passed in 2017 requires Chinese companies to support, assist and cooperate with China's intelligence agencies, wherever these companies operate (NY Times, 2019b).” China is an authoritarian country and a Chinese company like Huawei is unable to resist the demands of the Chinese government. Therefore, the network equipment of Huawei poses a potential threat to the national security of the U.S. (BBC, 2019b). At the Munich Security Conference held in February 2019, the U.S. Vice President Mike Pence once again emphasized that “The United States has also been very clear with our security partners on the threat posed by Huawei and other Chinese telecom companies, as Chinese law requires them to provide Beijing's vast security apparatus with access to any data that touches their network or equipment (SCMP, 2019)”. This shows that the United States is worried not about Huawei per se but China's state apparatus as a whole: the actions against Huawei are not only pure legal issues, but also a significant geopolitical action.

      Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar, an Estonian diplomat involved in cyber security discussions with American and European officials about Huawei, said Europe was shifting on Huawei because of suspicions about China rather than any specific behavior of this company. She highlighted China's history of hacking and stealing trade secrets, its poor record on human rights and internet censorship, and Chinese cyber security rules that could require Chinese enterprises to defend China's national security interests (NY Times, 2019c).

      James Andrew Lewis, the Senior Vice President and Director of Technology Policy Program from the American think-tank, Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes that “If China was not a strategic competitor, buying Chinese telecom equipment would pose little risk, and commercial partnership would serve both sides (Lewis, 2018).” But, unfortunately, according to the National Security Strategy released by the Trump Administration in December 2017, the United States has regarded China as its primary strategic competitor. This means that Huawei, as a Chinese company, will pose a major threat to the national security of the U.S. through its communication network equipment. Therefore, the issue of Huawei has actually become a matter of geopolitical competition between the United States and China.

      In addition, the ideological differences between the U.S. and China have also played a role in this dispute. In the eyes of the United States, China's authoritarian state capitalism model is significantly different from the liberal market capitalism of Western countries. At present, this model has a certain attraction to some developing countries. Given its great success over the past few decades and its huge scale, China is now eligible to compete against the Western model. In recent years, China has vigorously promoted its “Belt and Road Initiative”. From the perspective of the United States, China is not only pushing through its geopolitical “grand strategy”, but also trying to export its development model which is remarkably different from the “Washington Consensus”. Thus, China is increasingly challenging the international order and structure established and dominated by the U.S. and Western countries in not only geopolitical but also ideological terms.

      Since Huawei has achieved great business success, especially in overseas markets, most Chinese people prefer to ignore the ruthless management of this company and regard it as emblematic of China's national pride. The United States' attack on this company, widely admired in China, without incontrovertible grounds will probably provoke Chinese people's nationalist sentiments, thus boosting the influence of nationalist forces in China's domestic politics and further strengthening China's authoritarian regime. Therefore, in terms of promoting more “liberalization” in China, the actions against Huawei seems to be counterproductive.

      3. Overview of Huawei in Germany and the dilemma facing Germany

      3.1. Overview of Huawei in Germany

      As early as 2001, Huawei began to develop business in Germany. After years of efforts, all of its three major businesses groups (carrier business group, consumer business group, and enterprise business group) have made great progress. At present, Huawei is the prime strategic partner of Germany's three major telecommunications operators (Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, and Telefonica) in terms of supplying network equipment. For the smartphone business, Huawei's market share has surpassed Apple and made it the second largest mobile phone brand after Samsung. In addition, Huawei provides products and solutions of cloud computing, Internet of Things, enterprise network, and network security for various industrial sectors. It has also achieved major breakthroughs, such as building a smart city for Duisburg and providing high performance computing solutions for BMW.

      For Huawei, the German market is of extreme importance—perhaps second next to the Chinese market. On the one hand, the German market is huge; on the other hand, Huawei is a company coming from a developing country, therefore its Chinese managers are extremely eager to win the acceptance and recognition of the main, established, Western developed countries such as the U.S., the UK, France, and Germany. However, the United States, the UK, and France have imposed more restrictions on Huawei than Germany. Germany's attitude towards Huawei is relatively more pragmatic, allowing this Chinese company to utilize Germany's free and open economic environment to gradually grow into a heavyweight player. Huawei is also trying to make its projects in Germany references for its customers around the world. Therefore, Huawei has made huge investments in Germany regardless of cost. In 2007, Huawei moved its European headquarters from the UK to Düsseldorf, a western German city, and established its European R&D center in Munich to manage its 18 R&D institutions across Europe. From 2014 to 2018, Huawei invested US$400 million in Munich. By the end of 2015, Huawei had more than 2,000 employees in Germany, it is now one of the largest Chinese enterprises in Germany (MA REVIEW, 2016). Today, Huawei is prominent in Germany and industries and federal governments must think carefully when dealing with issues related to Huawei.

      3.2. Germany's dilemma in taking sides between the U.S. and China

      The United States has not only banned the purchase of Huawei's products in the U.S., but also launched a high-profile international action against Huawei and urged its allies to join it. Currently, among the countries of the U.S.-led “Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance” (U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), Australia and New Zealand have decided to follow the U.S. The UK has not yet decided, but British Telecom (BT) has decided that in the future Huawei shall be excluded from the core network of the 5G (but Huawei is still allowed to participate in the construction of wireless network). Moreover, BT will dismantle Huawei's equipment in the existing core network; Canada has not yet made a decision. In addition, Japan, as a close ally of the United States in East Asia and China's geopolitical rival, also announced in December 2018 that Huawei would be excluded from the government procurement list. Japan's three major telecommunications operators also indicated that they would follow the government's decision to prevent Huawei from participating in construction of its 5G network (BBC, 2019c).

      Among the European allies of the U.S., Germany's decision is crucial and all of Europe is watching Germany. According to the political news website POLITICO, in a closed-door meeting in December 2018, U.S. technology experts presented German policymakers with information they described as “reasons” to exclude Chinese telecom giant Huawei from the rollout of 5G technology in Germany. U.S. officials know Berlin's attitude is crucial when it comes to setting the tone toward Huawei across Europe. As the bloc's largest economy, Germany's decision on whether to restrict the Chinese company is likely to serve as a model for other European countries, many of which depend on Berlin's cyber security expertise (POLITICO, 2018). It will also determine whether the U.S. campaign is as successful in Europe as it was in Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.

      Given that Germany will auction 5G spectrum in the spring of 2019 and that telecommunications operators are in the process of starting 5G construction, this sudden pressure from its powerful traditional ally, the U.S., is putting Germany in a dilemma. On the one hand, Germany must seriously consider the demands of the U.S. On the other hand, in complying with the U.S. Germany risks angering China—an emerging superpower and Germany's largest trading partner. Hence, it is very difficult for Germany to make a choice.

      3.3. The opinions of German stakeholders on Huawei

      Although all parties are turning their attention to the German federal government on the question of whether to allow Huawei to participate in construction of the 5G network in Germany, as a democratic country the German government cannot ignore the opinions of other stakeholders. It must consider both domestic and international factors in order to make a final decision. The following is a brief analysis:

      Telecommunications operators (Deutsche Telecom, Vodafone, and Telefonica)
      Deutsche Telekom is the largest multinational telecommunications operator in Europe and has enjoyed a good relationship with Huawei for many years. On the one hand, Deutsche Telekom CEO Timotheus Höttges said, “the security of the network infrastructure, both past and present, is very important for us.” On the other hand, Deutsche Telekom continues to cooperate with Huawei. Given Huawei's technological leadership and price advantages, the progress of Deutsche Telekom's 5G rollout will get inevitably delayed and its construction costs increase if Huawei is not allowed to participate in the construction of the 5G network (Handelsblatt, 2019a).

      Nick Read, CEO of the UK-based Vodafone Group's German subsidiary, expressed some support for Huawei. He said, "We cannot ignore the fact that Huawei has occupied 35% of the entire European market. If Huawei is excluded, the progress of 5G network construction will be slowed down and the cost will increase. We need to clearly define which parts of the network can be built by Huawei, whether it is a sensitive core network or just a wireless access network." Given the security concerns, Vodafone decided that Huawei's products will no longer be used in the core network. However, Nick Read also defended Huawei. He said, "I feel that Huawei is open to the current situation and is working hard to improve the security of its products (Handelsblatt, 2019b)."

      Telefonica O2, another major German telecommunications operator, has opinions similar to Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone. It too does not want to ban Huawei from participating in its network construction.

      In order to address security concerns, Deutsche Telekom even suggested establishing a technical supervision agency similar to TÜV to ensure the security of network equipment, for which Vodafone and Telefonica expressed their support (SZ, 2019).

      German industry
      Although the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI), an organization representing the interests of German industries, has in an recently issued a policy document highlighted the challenges of China's state control model to Europe and Germany, it also emphasized that “a general ‘containment’ of China or ‘de-coupling’ (in the U.S. this term is used to discuss the disengagement in economic ties with China) is not an option; German industry advocates ex-change and cooperation (BDI, 2019)”. BDI also demonstrated its independence in safeguarding the interests of the German industry in deliberating whether or not Huawei should be allowed to participate in the construction of a 5G network in Germany. BDI Chairman Dieter Kempf clearly warned against excluding Huawei from the construction of 5G networks. He believes that this will lead China to take countermeasures, which will hurt the interests of German enterprises in China. At the same time, Dieter Kempf also supports the opinions of telecommunications operators that the exclusion of Huawei will limit the choice of suppliers and therefore result in increased network construction costs. Kempf further criticized the U.S. government's pressure to impose pressure on Germany. He said, “The United States could be tempted ... to enforce its own sanctions on others with its economic power. It seems that the motto is ‘who my enemy is, must also be my friend's enemy’.” However, that is not his philosophy, emphasized the BDI President: “And it contradicts our European idea of free, rule-based world trade (FAZ, 2019a).”

      IT Security Authority
      Arne Schönbohm, head of the German authority responsible for network security—Federal Office for IT Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI)—made it clear that banning or allowing Huawei's participation in 5G network construction is a “political decision”. In other words, this is not a technology issue pertaining to network security. According to Arne Schönbohm, “BSI's mission is to ensure that Germany has a secure network architecture. Until now, the so-called “back door” of Huawei products that can shut down German telecommunications network has not been discovered (Handelsblatt, 2019c).”

      Intelligence service agency
      However, the attitude of the German intelligence service agency is much more pessimistic as they believe the use of Huawei's products would have risk of espionage and destruction. In the perspective of German intelligence service, the mobile telecommunications network is a critical infrastructure and must be specially protected—and the risk that Huawei may install a "back door" cannot be overlooked. Although the argument of "back door" is only an unconfirmed suspicion, Gerhard Schindler, the former director of the Federal Intelligence Agency (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND), said, "Telecommunications technology provider is also capable of intercepting communications, you can deploy security systems and minimize risk, but the risk is still there." Schindler estimates that Huawei has been leading the 5G technology for one and a half to two years, so that the German state apparatus simply cannot judge which modules Huawei has installed. This means, “In times of crisis, if these modules are shut down, we will be unprepared and unable to react (DW, 2019).”

      Federal Ministry of the Interior and Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs
      Given the security concern, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior is discussing with the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs to revise the German telecommunications law to de facto exclude Huawei. According to the Ministry of the Interior, the Telecommunications Law should make the following changes: telecommunications operators and equipment suppliers must be able to ensure that there is no (foreign) state influence. However, the revision of the Telecommunications Law is a long process, which means that in theory the current German law cannot exclude any foreign suppliers (including Huawei) from construction of the 5G network (DW, 2019).

      Ministry of Foreign Affairs
      The German Foreign Ministry seems to be oblivious to the fact that China is Germany's largest trading partner and both countries have a strategic partnership. Their attitude is similar with that of the Ministry of the Interior. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that Huawei is a Chinese company subject to Chinese law, and expressed concern that Chinese companies have the obligation to cooperate with Chinese intelligence agencies (DW, 2019).

      German Chancellor
      As the head of the German government, Merkel has always been cautious about important issues, especially the sensitive issue of taking sides between the two most powerful countries in the world. On February 5, 2019, Merkel said during her visit to Japan, "Given the security concerns, it is necessary to discuss with the Chinese government that companies (of China) cannot pass data to (Chinese) state (FAZ, 2019b)." She is actually setting conditions for Huawei to participate in the construction of the 5G network in Germany. It cannot be denied that Merkel is a seasoned politician. She has exerted "strategic ambiguity" to avoid clearly taking sides between the United States and China by considering the demands of both countries. Of course, it is also possible that she is buying time in order to make final choice.

      In addition to the stakeholders such as telecommunications operators, German industry, and the German government, it must be mentioned that Germany is a democratic country and public opinions often play a role in government decision-making. Accordingly, it is difficult to ignore the fact that German media reports on China are mostly negative.

      China is Germany's largest trading partner and German companies have huge investments and economic interests in the Chinese market. Germany and China have established comprehensive and profound strategic partnerships. Moreover, as a middle power, Germany does not have the ambition, will, and resources to confront China geopolitically. However, the United States is Germany's traditional ally and a powerful provider of security. The tough demands of the U.S. have given the German government a difficult choice. The final decision of the German government is still unclear. However, what is clear is that the German government will not make decisions quickly, but will carefully evaluate the situation and find the best balance in line with German interests. Some people even think that, given the importance of this matter, the German parliament and not the German government will have the final say (KN, 2019).

      4. Can the United States form a united front against Huawei?

      Although the United States has spent a lot of efforts to convince its allies and other countries not to use Huawei's network equipment, it has had only limited results. At present, only the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan have clearly stated that Huawei will be excluded from the construction of 5G networks (BBC, 2019c). However, on February 19, 2019 the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern, said that her government had not yet made a final decision on use of Huawei's equipment in the 5G network (VOA, 2019). Therefore, to date, only Australia and Japan have explicitly followed the United States.

      These signs show that this time the United States might have difficulties in successfully forming a united front against Huawei and China. Some European commentators believe that President Trump has undermined the trust between Europe and the United States, making it difficult for Europe to choose between China and the United States. At present, European countries will take precautions against Huawei, especially in its role as supplier of core networks, but they are not willing to explicitly exclude Huawei from the entire 5G network. Of course, Europe also knows that Huawei is not completely irreplaceable. The restrictions on Huawei may be beneficial to European suppliers of telecommunications equipment: Ericsson from Sweden, Nokia from Finland, and Alcatel-Lucent from France.

      If a Sino-American confrontation is on the line, then the ability of the United States to form alliances and control allies seems to be declining as compared to Cold War 1.0. In March 2015, as the closest ally of the United States, the United Kingdom did not hesitate to anger the United States and joined the China-led “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank” (AIIB). Like other middle powers, Britain relies no longer solely on the United States but bets on both sides. For the UK, this is a matter of life and death. The focus of British economy lies in the service sectors, especially the financial service industry. If the UK cannot serve the financial and economic interests of a rising China, then the UK will be marginalized in the 21st century. In fact, apart from cooperating with China, the UK does not have much choice (Lind, 2018).

      Other European allies of the United States are also reluctant to sacrifice their commercial interests with respect to China by blindly obeying America's strategic needs. Compared with the formidable Soviet Red Army in Cold War 1.0 period, China's growing military power does not pose a direct threat to Western Europe. Ideologically, China is not as aggressive as the former Soviet Union which claimed to "bury the capitalist system". If the United States intends to contain China from now on, it would be difficult to win full recognition and acceptance of the Western European countries as it did during Cold War 1.0. Of course, the United States might not be very concerned about this. For the United States, the most important partners to contain China can be found in Asia-Pacific region: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are much more important in this regard than Western Europe. The "Indo-Pacific strategy" proposed by Japan, supported by Australia and India, and finally accepted by the United States, will become the main geopolitical strategy to contain China. The "democratic security diamond" comprising of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India will probably become a multilateral military alliance similar to NATO in Europe. Moreover, even if "old Europe" (France and Germany) does not follow the instructions of the U.S., the United States can still find more obedient partners in "New Europe" (Central and Eastern European countries).

      With its considerable strength and remaining leadership, the United States could form a united front to contain China. However, the internal solidarity of this coalition is quite suspicious. During the Cold War 1.0 period, the Eastern Bloc broke out between China and the Soviet Union. China turned to the United States and it was a strategic blow to Soviet leadership. Similarly, inside the Western Group, President Charles de Gaulle of France promoted independent foreign policy, built independent nuclear power, and withdrew from NATO. Even loyal West Germany advocated a “New Eastern Policy” under the Brandt government, under which West Germany tried to improve relations with the Eastern Bloc countries: this demonstrated the independence of West Germany. In 2003, the United States insisted on starting a war against Iraq, but France and Germany were openly and resolutely opposed. Similarly, in 2015, the UK, France, and Germany joined the China-led AIIB at the price of angering the United States. Therefore, even if the United States can successfully form a united front to contain China, it cannot guarantee that the member states will fully obey its will, and American values do not allow the United States to suppress the indiscretions of its allies by using force, as the former Soviet Union did with Hungary (1956) and with Czechoslovakia (1956) during the Cold War 1.0.

      However, it is debatable if Germany will be able to withstand pressure from the United States on the issue of Huawei. After Tian'anmeng incident in 1989, Europe and the United States imposed an arms embargo on China. For years, China has been trying to persuade the EU to lift the embargo. The then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder supported China's request, and together with France vigorously promoted the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China. However, due to strong opposition from the United States, the effort finally failed. In some sense, today's issue of Huawei's entry into 5G network construction is similar to China's request to ask the EU to lift the arms embargo.

      5. The prelude to Cold War 2.0?

      On March 5, 1946, accompanied by U.S. President Truman, Churchill made the famous "Iron Curtain" speech in the United States, giving voice to the serious and urgent threat of Soviet expansionism. Churchill's speech is widely regarded as a crucial moment in the genesis of the Cold War. U.S. Vice-President Mike Pence's tough speech on China at the Hudson Institute in October 2018 was also considered by many to be a mobilization for Cold War 2.0 against China, which can be compared with Churchill's speech to open Cold War 1.0. If the United States and China are entering a new cold war, this time it would be significantly different from the old Cold War. The former Soviet Union relied mainly on its formidable military power to confront the West and posed a direct military threat to Western Europe. Moreover, the communism of the Eastern Bloc and the liberal democracy of the Western countries also constituted a fierce ideological confrontation. However, the rise of China is mainly due to its unprecedented economic development and rapid progress in science and technology. Its people's living standards have improved significantly: this, in turn, constitutes an important and main source of the legitimacy for the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. Another source is nationalism, but nationalism has always been a dangerous double-edged sword and Chinese rulers must use this force carefully. Therefore, if the United States wants to launch a new Cold War against China, economy and technology will be the main battlefields and the confrontation of military power and ideology will play a secondary role. However, if the United States and China cannot properly manage and control conflicts between them, it cannot be ruled out that the economic and technological contests will escalate to a full-scale confrontation of military power and ideology.

      In this context, as the epitome of China's rise and an outstanding representative of China's scientific and technological progress and economic development, Huawei has become the primary target of the United States. This is not surprising: it is a logical development of the U.S.-China confrontation.

      One year after Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, in March 1947, US President Truman gave a speech in Congress, which was later called "Trumanism". Truman announced that the United States was willing to provide economic and military assistance to the Greece government to fight against the Communist Party. Turkey faced a similar situation as Greece and would also receive U.S. aid. Trumanism meant the end of the alliance with the Soviet Union during the World War II and marked the beginning of the Cold War, since then the United States began to provide financial means to contain the Soviet Union. Similarly, US Vice President Pence's tough speech against China might be a public mobilization. Shortly afterwards, a comprehensive attack on Huawei started, probably marking the beginning of the new Cold War against China. The previous crackdown on ZTE could be considered a strategic rehearsal. The result was a great success. The Chinese side accepted all U.S. demands, even the assignment of U.S. inspectors to ZTE at ZTE's costs. Success of the action against ZTE is likely to give US the confidence to beat Huawei.

      The U.S.-China trade war was initiated by the United States. It is hard to conclude that China is willing to participate in this conflict that may terminate its rise. However, China's eagerness to seek success and its daring strategic advances in recent years have probably led it into a “Thucydides trap”. Now that China has abandoned Deng Xiaoping's strategy of keeping a low profile, it will surely bring the U.S.-China showdown ahead of schedule—which will be greatly detrimental to its own future.

      6. Conclusion

      The actions of the U.S. against Huawei, emblematic of Chinese national pride, have touched sensitive nerves in both countries. The U.S. and China seem to be accelerating their fall into the so-called "Thucydides trap": this has led to overwhelming discussions and uneasiness around the world. The arrest of Huawei's CFO and the subsequent demand to ban Huawei from participating in the construction of vital 5G networks is not only a legal issue, technical issue, and geo-economic issue: it is also a geopolitical issue. Only in this context would we be able to understand why the U.S, a superpower, is worried about a Chinese company. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has undergone profound changes and a major power shift is taking place. The United States has gradually reached a conclusion that China is its prime strategic competitor, capable of challenging American hegemony over and above Russia, its traditional rival. The United States will not tolerate the strategic balance to continue leaning towards China. Under the leadership of President Trump, the United States will take firm and decisive actions to ensure that the United States continues to be the superpower with world hegemony. Faced with this situation, most countries are unable to stay outside. In the turmoil of whether or not Huawei should be allowed to participate in the construction of a 5G network, Germany is at the forefront of the storm and faces a difficult choice between the U.S. and China. Germany's decision will have a major demonstration effect, and all of Europe is watching Germany. However, Germany should not make a quick choice. Instead, it should carefully evaluate the situation, consider all parties' attitudes, repeatedly calculate the pros and cons, and then take a final decision that should be in line with German interests.

      7. References

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      DW (2019). Deutsche Sicherheitsbehörden warnen vor Huawei. Available at: https://www.dw.com/de/deutsche-sicherhei...awei/a-47301398 (accessed March 6, 2019).

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      FAZ (2019b). Merkel stellt Bedingungen für Huawei-Auftrag. Available at: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/d...u-16024961.html (accessed March 6, 2019).

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      Forbes (2018). The Feds Shamefully Persecute China's Huawei For Being Too Successful. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2...too-successful/ (accessed March 6, 2019).

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      Handelsblatt (2019c). BSI-Chef hält sich aus Streit um Huawei und 5G heraus. Available at: https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deu...teaxI7YXN6H-ap2 (accessed March 6, 2019).

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    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "美中对抗与德国站队 - 谁将赢得新时代的军备竞赛(5G)?" geschrieben. 24.02.2019

      1 引言

      华为公司被广泛认为是中国最杰出、最强大和最具进攻精神的ICT(Information Communication Technology)企业,一直致力于进入美国市场。但是与在全球市场不断开疆拓土的卓越业绩截然相反的是,华为长期以来未能实现在美国市场的重大突破,原因是美国的国家机构以国家安全为由阻止美国客户购买华为产品、解决方案和服务。进入2018年以来,美国对华为公司发起了迄今为止最为严厉的打击行动。2018年12月,美国司法部以该公司涉嫌违反美国对伊朗的制裁为由,下令逮捕其CFO孟晚舟,并要求加拿大将孟引渡至美国受审。与此同时,美国决定禁止华为参与至关重要的5G网络建设。有充分的迹象显示,美国的国家机构已经将打击这家极为成功、且被视为中国崛起缩影的科技企业变成了一个重要的战略目标,并不遗余力地动员其传统和新兴盟友加入这个行列。

      与在美国市场受到的冷遇和防范形成鲜明对比的是,德国却相当欢迎华为的投资和经营活动。而华为也特别看重德国市场,将其西欧总部设在德国西部城市杜塞尔多夫。这不仅仅是因为德国在欧洲首屈一指的市场规模,更重要的是,德国作为一个主要的发达国家,其接受和认可对华为的全球市场拓展具有非凡的示范意义。多年来,华为公司在德国持续投入大量资源,市场版图不断扩张。德国对华为之重要,以至于华为德国公司公关部负责人Torsten Küpper称德国是华为的“第二故乡” 。

      但是,作为德国自二战结束以来的最强大盟友和安全保护提供者,美国敦促德国效法澳大利亚、新西兰和日本等美国盟国,禁止华为参加5G网络建设,加入其打击华为公司的国际行动。为此,德国面临在美中两个世界最强大国之间选边站的艰难决定。

      本文并不致力于预测德国将如何选边站,而是试图系统性地分析德美两国在对待华为公司的立场和政策方面的异同及其原因、德国内部各方对华为问题的立场、影响德国抉择的因素以及德国决策对德中关系和变动中世界格局的影响。

      2 华为的美国之路及美国对华为的政策

      2.1 华为在美国的发展历程

      美国是全球首屈一指的通讯设备市场,2016年的市场容量达到832.2亿美元 ,预计到2025年将增加到1251亿美元 。因此,突破美国市场,对志向远大的华为公司具有决定性的战略意义。

      早在1999年,华为就在达拉斯开设了一个研究所,专门针对美国市场开发产品。2001年6月,华为在美国德克萨斯州成立全资子公司FutureWei,开始向当地企业销售宽带和数据产品 。

      随着华为在美国市场的挺进,针对华为产品的质疑同步而来。2003年初,Cisco向美国德克萨斯州法院起诉华为侵犯其知识产权。经过长达一年半的专利之争,双方最终达成了和解。但是这场纷争严重影响了华为在美国市场的声誉,使得华为业务进展非常缓慢。

      2007年,华为与美国移动运营商LeapWireless达成第一次合作,开始取得一些市场进展。但是,华为主要是为一些中小型运营商提供服务,一直不能进入美国市场的四大主流通讯运营商(Verizon、AT&T、Sprint和T-Mobile)。

      2008年以后,华为试图采取并购策略进入美国,却屡屡受阻。其标志性的事件如下 :

      三次并购被否
       2008年华为试图与贝恩资本联合并购3Com,被美国外国投资委员会(CFIUS)否决;
       2010年华为试图收购摩托罗拉的无线资产,同样被美国政府拒绝;
       2010年华为试图并购宽带网络软件厂商2Wire,但因对方担心无法获批而失败。

      一次专利并购被否
       2010年,华为以200万美元收购了3Leaf的专利技术,但该项交易再次被CFIUS认为“会威胁美国安全”,华为最终于2011年2月撤销该交易。

      除并购失败外,华为与AT&T 的4G设备合约(2009年)以及与Sprint的4G设备合约(2010年),分别在美国国家安全局(NSA) 和美国商务部 的干预下被否决。

      2012年10月,在对华为、中兴展开了超过一年的调查后,美国众议院情报委员会发布报告称,“华为和中兴是中国政府的工具,从美国公司偷窃知识产权,并有对美国开展间谍活动的可能性”,因此,这两家公司“构成对美国国家安全的威胁”,并警告美国电信公司不要采购他们的设备 。

      在众议院报告发布之后,美国通讯运营商的网络设备市场实际上已经对华为关闭,但是华为仍然试图在美国销售手机等终端产品,然而同样受到强烈限制。2018年1月,在美国国会议员的敦促下,美国大型通讯运营商AT&T临时取消了与华为的智能手机交易,原因同样是担心华为“会对美国国家安全造成威胁” 。

      2018年3月,根据CFIUS的建议,美国总统Trump亲自下令,否决新加坡公司Broadcom以1170亿美元收购美国著名的通讯芯片和无线技术公司Qualcomm(高通)。原因是CFIUS担心,Broadcom收购成功后将导致削减对Qualcomm在研发方面的投资,从而间接有利于Qualcomm的中国竞争对手华为公司,进而危及美国的“国家安全” 。Trump政府极度担忧华为这家中国公司获得相对于美国的技术优势和支配地位,尤其是在被称为新时代军备竞赛战场的5G移动通信领域。与之前历届美国政府相比,Trump政府对华为公司的防范可谓有增无减。

      不仅美国政府,美国国会对华为和中兴这两家中国ICT企业的警惕有过之而无不及。继2012年众议院情报委员会报告后,参议院在2018年7月22日通过的“2019年度John S. McCain国防授权法案”中明确要求:禁止联邦政府(作者注:还没有明令禁止美国企业)采购任何华为或中兴的设备或服务 ,也禁止参与、延长或更新合同。

      2.2 美国发起打击华为的行动

      2018年12月初,美国司法部以涉嫌违反美国对伊朗制裁禁令为由,发出了对华为CFO孟晚舟的拘捕令,并要求加拿大将在该国转机的孟引渡至美国受审。而且,据《纽约时报》在2019年2月12日的报道,Trump政府将发布一项行政命令,禁止美国电信公司在建设下一代无线网络时使用中国设备 ,从而将华为和中兴,尤其是将在5G领域全面领先的华为公司拒之门外。与此同时,美国政府发起了一项针对华为的、高调的国际行动,要求国际社会尤其是盟国跟随美国,禁止中国的华为公司参与5G网络建设。美国国务卿Mike Pompeo甚至警告说,美国将不能与那些使用华为设备的国家成为伙伴或共享信息 。这显然是发出了要求各国在美中之间选边站的强烈信号。

      由此可见,美国对中国ICT领军企业华为和中兴的防范和限制,尤其是对更强大的华为的深重戒心,乃是“冰冻三尺非一日之寒”,且已经上升到了“国家安全”的高度,并正在推进落实具体的限制政策。对此,美国的共和民主两党、国会参众两院和联邦政府,均达成了高度的共识,十多年来一以贯之。

      2.3 对美国打击华为行动的分析解读

      美国拘捕华为CFO的行动以及禁止采购华为产品的一系列大阵仗事件,是一个法律问题,也是一个网络安全技术问题,同时还是一个与经济和科技竞争有关的地缘经济问题,更深层次上是一个地缘政治问题。

      法律角度
      从法律角度来看,不能否认美国也曾经处罚了诸多违反美国制裁禁令的美国和它国公司,但是直接拘捕公司高管,却是极为罕见的行动 。在华为创始人任正非(孟晚舟也是她的女儿)看来,美国此举的目的是要达到对华为最大的打击效果 。拿与伊朗做生意作为处罚依据,也许在法律上能够成立,但在政治意图上却非常可疑。即便在法律意义上说得过去,但也存在“选择性”执法的可能。正如美国Forbes杂志上一篇文章指出,其实很多美国公司同样与受到制裁的“古巴、伊朗、苏丹和叙利亚”等国做生意,只不过是通过第三方来进行 。而且,支撑此次拘捕行动的法律依据 – “长臂管辖”,也并非国际法的通行规则,很多国家认为它严重违背“一个国家不应该在另一个国家的领土上行使国家权力”国际法原则,而不承认其管辖权效力。在北京眼里,这是美国在动用国家力量打压一家被奉为民族骄傲的中国企业,其本质是用法律手段来代替公平竞争。

      网络安全角度
      考虑到5G基础设施的战略重要性,美国政府高度重视网络安全。为消除对中国在全球通讯供应链上迅速增加的影响力的担忧,美国国家安全委员会曾经有过由国家而不是私营运营商来建设“国有化”全国5G网络的设想,以加强对网络的控制 。虽然这个计划未能得到实行,但考虑到美国有“小政府、大市场”的自由主义传统,一直避免国家过多介入经济事务,美国政府对5G网络安全前所未有的重视程度可见一斑。

      对于华为来说,进入美国和西欧发达国家市场具有特别重要的意义,一方面是因为美欧市场容量巨大,对极为注重业务扩张的华为公司来说是兵家必争之地;另一方面是因为如果华为的产品和解决方案能够得到高标准严要求的欧美客户认可,将产生极大的全球示范效应,从而对其全球市场扩张具有不可估量的正面作用。因此,华为往往是不惜代价地持续投入大量资源,不放过任何一个进入欧美市场的机会。2010年,为消除英国政府对华为产品安全性的担忧,华为与英国最高级别的情报部门 – 政府通信总部(GCHQ)联合建立了“华为网络安全评估中心”( Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre),专门负责对华为部署在英国市场的产品进行安全评估。2019年2月21日,英国《金融时报》的报道称,GCHQ下属的国家网络安全中心(National Cyber Security Centre,NCSC)的主任Ciaran Martin表示,他有信心认为,如果英国政府决定让华为参与未来的5G网络,英国网络安全部门可以管控这家中国电信设备制造商构成的任何风险。在布鲁塞尔发表的一次演讲中, Ciaran Martin表示,尽管美国情报机构提出了关于间谍活动和扰乱的担忧,但他相信严格的控制和监督可以抵消风险 。

      英国是与美国有着所谓“英美特殊关系”的亲密盟国,而且在评估华为产品安全性方面拥有多年实际经验,因此英国网络安全部门的结论极具分量,表明对华为产品在安全方面的担忧至少在技术上是可以得到控制的。此外,尽管美国一直怀疑华为产品留有“后门”,很可能被中国政府和军方利用来从事间谍活动,但十多年来,美国却拿不出有力证据。因此,很难说围绕华为的安全问题争论仅仅是一个单纯的技术问题。

      地缘经济角逐:围绕5G展开的激烈竞争
      Trump政府认为,世界正在进行一场新的军备竞赛。虽然这是一场涉及技术,而非常规武器的竞赛,但对美国的国家安全构成同样重大的威胁。在一个由计算机网络控制着最强有力武器的时代,任何主导5G技术的国家,都将在本世纪的大部分时间拥有经济、情报和军事上的优势。美国已经在3G和4G的竞争中落后于欧洲和中国,而华为在5G领域的全面领先,更让美国担心不已。因此,美国决心通过阻止华为,以确保不输掉这场至关重要的竞争 。

      美国哥伦比亚大学教授Jeffrey Sachs撰文指出,“很明显,美国拘捕孟晚舟的行动是Trump政府更广泛的削弱中国经济的努力的一部分,其它手段还包括增加关税、对中国关闭高技术出口市场和阻止中国收购美欧科技公司。不夸张地说,这是一场针对中国的经济战争,而且是一场轻率的战争。Trump政府,而非华为或中国,才是当今国际法治的最大威胁,而且危及全球和平 。”

      经济发展归根结底是由创新驱动。相对于中国,美国尽管还拥有总体上的优势,但中国正在全方位迅速追赶,在部分领域(如5G)还有超越美国之势头。科技创新优势地位的丧失,是美国不能接受的,所以美国决心采用各种手段坚决捍卫。在美中贸易战中,美国的真实诉求不仅是减少贸易逆差。由于中国出口的很大一部分实际上来自美国公司,因此单纯以贸易赤字为理由说不过去,中国从中获益没有数字显示那么大。如果目标只是减少贸易赤字,那么中国其实愿意做出让步,谈判早该达成协议。美国真正的目的是要阻止中国高科技产业的发展。

      美中地缘政治角逐和意识形态对抗
      实际上,华为在欧洲巨大的市场份额表明,华为公司的技术实力和创新能力在西方受到广泛承认和尊敬。然而,问题的关键在于华为是一家中国企业。美国国家反情报与安全中心(National Counterintelligence and Security Center)主任William R. Evanina称,“重要的是记住,中国企业与中国政府的关系不同于西方私营企业与西方政府的关系。中国2017年生效的《国家情报法》要求中国企业支持、协助和配合国家情报工作,不管它们在哪里经营。 ”美国认为,中国是一个威权统治的国家,作为一家中国公司,华为无法抵抗中国政府的要求,从而使得其生产的网络设备构成潜在威胁 。在2019年2月举行的慕尼黑安全会议上,美国副总统Pence再次强调了中国的法律允许其庞大的安全机构有权要求中国企业配合其行动 。不过,这恰恰说明美国担心的并不是华为公司本身,而是中国的国家机构;针对华为的行动不仅是单纯的法律行为,而且还是一场果断的地缘政治行动。

      参与了与欧美官员讨论华为网络安全问题的爱沙尼亚外交官Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar称,欧洲对华为的转变是因为怀疑中国,而不是这家公司的具体行为。她特别指出中国的黑客攻击和盗窃行业机密的历史,其在人权和网络审查上的糟糕记录,以及可能要求网络企业保卫国家安全利益的中国网络安全法规。

      美国智库“战略与国际研究中心”的James Andrew Lewis认为,“如果中国不是一个战略竞争对手,那么购买中国电信设备只有很小的风险,商业伙伴关系对双方都是有利的。 ”但不幸的是,根据Trump政府在2017年12月发布的《国家安全战略》,美国已经视中国为其首要战略竞争对手,这意味着,中国企业华为公司产品进入美国的通讯网络构成了对美国国家安全的重大威胁。因此,华为问题实际上已经上升成为美中两国之间的地缘政治较量。

      此外,美中意识形态差异也在这场争端中扮演了一定角色。在美国看来,中国的威权国家资本主义模式显著不同于西方自由市场资本主义,目前这个模式对第三世界国家产生了一定吸引力。鉴于中国在过去几十年的巨大成功以及庞大体量,因而有资格构成对西方模式的竞争。中国近年来大力推行“一带一路”倡议,在美国眼里不但是中国的重大地缘政治战略,而且还是在试图输出有别于“华盛顿共识”的发展模式,从而在地缘政治和意识形态上对美国和西方主导的国际秩序和格局构成了双重挑战。

      由于华为公司在商业上尤其是海外市场的巨大成功,使得大多数中国民众并不在意该公司冷酷无情的管理方式,反而视之为民族骄傲。美国以并非无可辩驳的理由重手打击这家在中国广受爱戴的企业,必将激发中国人民的民族主义情绪,从而助推民族主义势力在中国国内政治的影响力进一步上升,进而强化中国的威权主义政体。对于希望促进中国更加“自由化”的西方国家来说,似乎是事与愿违。

      3 华为在德国概况及德国面临的站队困境

      3.1 华为在德国的概况

      早在2001年,华为就开始在德国进行市场拓展,经过多年努力,其三大业务(通讯运营商业务、终端业务和企业业务)都已取得长足进展。目前,华为是德国三大运营商(德国电信、Vodafone和Telefonica)的主要通讯设备战略合作伙伴。在智能手机领域,华为的市场占有率已经超越苹果成为仅次于三星的手机品牌。此外,在企业领域,华为为各行业提供云计算、物联网、企业网、网络安全等解决方案,也实现了一些重大项目突破,比如与杜伊斯堡市合作建设智慧城市、为宝马公司提供高性能计算方案等项目。

      德国市场对华为公司极其重要,也许仅次于中国市场:一方面是因为德国市场本身容量巨大;另一方面,华为是一个出身卑贱的企业(来自于发展中国家),因而极度渴望得到美英法德等主要老牌西方发达国家的接受和认可。但美英法对华为的限制要超过德国,而德国对待华为的态度和政策更为务实,允许这家中国企业利用德国自由开放的经济环境,一步步成长为德国ICT领域的重量级玩家。华为也极力把其德国客户塑造成可以大力鼓吹的样板点,以辐射全球市场。因此,华为在德国市场往往是不计代价地投入。2007年,华为将其欧洲总部从英国搬至德国西部城市杜塞尔多夫,并在慕尼黑建立欧洲研发中心,管理其全欧范围的18个研发机构。多年来,华为在德国持续大量投资,从2014年到2018年,仅在慕尼黑就投资达4亿美元。截止2018年底,华为在德员工人数超过2000人 ,是在德最大中资企业之一。今日华为在德国地位之显赫,以至于经济界和联邦政府在处理涉华为问题时都必须瞻前顾后、三思慎行。

      3.2 德国面临选边站队的困难决定

      美国不但在国内事实上禁止采购华为产品,而且还发起了一场高调的国际行动来打击华为,敦促其盟友加入这个行列。目前,以美国为首的情报共享组织“五眼联盟”中的国家(美国、英国、加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰)中:澳大利亚和新西兰已经率先跟进;英国尚未完全决定,但英国电信已经决定在未来5G网络建设的核心网部分排除华为(仍然可以参与无线接入网),并拆除现有核心网中的华为设备;加拿大尚未作出决定。此外,日本作为美国在东亚的紧密盟国和中国的地缘政治对手,也在2018年12月宣布把华为从政府采购清单中排除,日本三大通讯运营商表示将跟随政府决定,不让华为参与5G网络建设。

      而在欧洲盟友中,德国的决定至关重要,整个欧洲都在观望德国。作为欧洲最大经济体,德国在美中两个最强大国之间的选边站队,是一个风向标,具有极大的示范效应。

      根据政治新闻网站POLITICO的报道,在2018年12月的一次闭门会议中,美国技术专家向德国政策制定者们出示了相关信息,作为要求德国将华为从5G网络建设排除的理由。美方完全清楚,柏林的态度将影响整个欧洲,其它欧洲国家信任德国在网络安全方面的经验和能力,因而很可能仿效德国的决策 。

      考虑到德国将于2019年春季拍卖5G频率,各运营商也正在紧锣密鼓地开始5G建设规划,面对强大的传统盟友美国突如其来的压力,以及可能触怒新兴超级大国、同时也是德国最大贸易伙伴中国的风险,德国政府正处于聚光灯之下,可谓进退两难、宽严皆误。

      3.3德国内部各方在华为问题上的立场

      在是否允许华为参与德国5G建设这个难题上,尽管目前所有各方都把目光转向德国联邦政府,但是,作为一个民主国家,德国政府不能无视其它利益攸关者的态度,必须综合权衡国内国际诸多因素,才能作出最终决定。以下是一个简略分析:

      通讯运营商(德国电信、Vodafone和Telefonica):
      德国电信(Deutsche Telekom)是欧洲最大的跨国电信运营商,多年来与华为有良好的合作关系。一方面,德国电信CEO Timotheus Höttges说,“网络基础设施的安全性,不管是过去还是现在,对我们都是非常重要的。”但另一方面,目前德国电信仍然继续与华为的合作;如果不允许华为参与未来的5G网络建设,考虑到华为在技术上的领先和价格上的优势,那么势必将延缓德国电信的网络建设进度并大大增加建设成本 。

      总部位于英国的Vodafone集团德国子公司CEO Nick Read则表达了对华为的某种支持,他说,“华为已经占据整个欧洲市场份额的35%,不能无视这个事实。如果排除华为,那么5G建设的进度将会放慢,成本将会增加。我们需要清楚地界定,华为可以参加哪些网络部分的建设,是敏感的核心网部分还是仅仅只是无线接入网。”鉴于对华为产品安全性的担忧,Vodafone决定,在核心网部分将不再使用中国产品。但是Nick Read同时也对华为进行辩护,他说,“我感觉华为对目前形势是持开放态度的,并正在努力改进其产品安全性。 ”

      德国另一家主要的通讯运营商Telefonica O2与德国电信和Vodafone立场类似,也不希望禁止华为参与其网络建设。为消除安全方面的疑虑,德国电信甚至建议成立一个类似于“安全TÜV”的技术监督机构,对此Vodafone和Telefonica表示支持 。

      德国工业界:
      代表德国工业界利益的组织,“德国工业联合会”(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie,BDI)尽管在不久前发布的中国政策文件中强调了中国国家控制的模式对欧洲和德国的挑战,但该文件并不同意美国与中国“脱钩”的倾向,强调要与中国展开良性竞争,而不是将中国排除在世界秩序之外 。在关于是否允许华为参与德国5G建设的问题上,BDI也展示了其维护德国工业界自身利益的独立性。BDI主席Dieter Kempf明确警告,不要将华为从5G网络建设中排除,他认为这将导致中国采取对应措施,从而有损德国企业利益。同时,Dieter Kempf也支持通讯运营商的观点,即排斥华为将限制对供应商的选择,从而导致网络建设成本增加。Kempf进一步批评了美国政府施加压力的做法,他说,“美国人试图用其经济强权来实施对他人的制裁,他们的逻辑是,‘美国与谁为敌,美国的盟友就也得与其为敌。’”但是,Kempf对此表示反对,并强调美国逻辑与“维护自由并基于规则的世界贸易”的欧洲观念相抵触 。

      网络安全技术部门:
      德国政府负责网络安全技术的部门 – 联邦信息技术安全局(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,BSI)负责人Arne Schönbohm明确表示,是否禁止华为参与5G网络建设,是一个“政治决策”,言下之意是,这并非是一个网络安全技术问题。Arne Schönbohm称,“BSI的任务是,确保德国有一个安全的网络架构。所谓能够关闭德国电信网络的华为‘后门’,迄今为止并没有发现。 ”

      情报部门:
      但是,德国情报部门的态度则要悲观得多,认为采用中国华为公司的产品将会带来窃听和破坏的风险。情报部门认为,移动通讯网络属于关键基础设施,必须加以特别保护,而华为公司可能安装“后门”。尽管“后门”的说法只是一个未经证实的怀疑,但联邦情报局(Bundesnachrichtendienst,BND)前局长Gerhard Schindler称,“谁提供了通讯技术,谁就能窃听和解析通讯。你可以建造安全系统,也可以把风险降到最低,但风险仍然存在。” Schindler认为,华为在5G技术上领先一年半到两年,因此德国的国家机构根本就不能判断华为到底安装了哪些模块。这也就意味着,“在危机时刻,如果这些模块被关闭,我们将毫无准备,而且也无法应对。 ”

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "论中国的“国家资本主义”" geschrieben. 06.02.2019

      许多西方学者和政治家认为,今日中国奉行的并不是“有中国特色的社会主义”,而是“有中国特色的资本主义”,即所谓“威权统治下的国家资本主义”。在不少西方学者和政客看来,中国模式在政治方面是一党极权、经济方面由国家控制、社会方面则压制独立的公民社会。更重要的是,过去几十年来,中国经济取得了前所未有的迅猛增长,导致中国领导层对这套模式不但相当自信,而且还有意向广大发展中国家输出这套模式,横空出世的“一带一路”就是明证。鉴于中国的庞大体量和举国体制的强大执行力,西方感受到在苏联解体后首次遭遇一个强劲对手。这个对手不但在地缘政治上对美国霸权和西方主导地位构成挑战,而且给世界提供了一套迥异于西方自由民主价值观、但似乎充满活力的发展模式,从而在意识形态上也危及西方的优势地位。西方数十年来指望,中国将随着经济发展和中产阶级壮大而变得更“自由化”。但是,这个指望如今已经落空,试图“融入”中国的“绥靖政策”已经彻底失败。因此,西方日益达成共识,必须转而对中国遏制和围堵。美中贸易战的爆发,不过是“冷战2.0”的序幕而已。经济和科技的跨越式发展,是中国自信心膨胀的源泉,也是政权合法性的依托。因此,在“冷战2.0”中,经济和科技是主战场,华为公司这样的民族产业之花被拿来祭旗,也不必大惊小怪。其实,作为一家企业,华为在西方受到广泛尊敬,华为错就错在它是一家中国公司,华为是被中国“拖累”了。

      对于“国家资本主义”模式的判断,不能说没有道理,但我认为似乎过于简单武断,低估了中国政治经济发展模式的多样性和发展前景的复杂性。

      在我看来,今日之中国至少存在三种发展模式:以北京为代表的国家资本主义模式,国有企业居于主导地位,权力决定资源配置,姑且称之为“北京模式”;以上海为代表的买办资本主义模式,跨国资本占据很大优势,是为“上海模式”;以深圳为代表的民族资本主义模式,重视自主创新的民族资本大放异彩,可以称之为“深圳模式”。

      断言中国仅仅是“北京模式”一统天下是不准确的,以中国之大,上海模式和深圳模式也各领风骚。但是,进入新世纪后,国家资本日益得势并压迫跨国资本和民族资本的生存空间,也是一个不应否认的事实,所谓“国进民退”描述的就是这个现象。2008年,世界金融危机爆发,中国政府为刺激经济而推出了大搞基建的四万亿庞大投资计划。中央政府一声令下,地方政府大干快上,实际投资很可能超过十万亿人民币。在这一轮基建投资狂潮中,受益的主要是以国有企业为代表的国家资本。大规模的基建投资,不可能一直搞下去,当国内投资需求不再能满足国家资本主义的巨大胃口时,就要对外扩张。“一带一路”不是天上掉下来的,也不是某个人的主张,而是整个国家资本的集体推动。而国家资本在国家意志主导下的大举对外扩张,很容易被人指责是帝国主义。帝国主义是什么?列宁说过,帝国主义就是战争。只不过在核时代,各大国慑于核武器的巨大破坏力,尽量避免爆发热战,但冷战就难说了。

      实际上,西方既不喜欢国家资本主义的“北京模式”,也不愿意中国走上民族资本自主创新的“深圳模式”。国家资本主义意味着后发国家可以靠国家意志集中资源实现跨越式发展,东亚几个国家的成功故事,就是国家主导经济发展的结果;而“深圳模式”的典型代表,华为不就成长为西方跨国公司的强大对手了嘛!西方内心希望的是,中国选择“上海模式”,或者说“拉美模式”,成为跨国资本的原料来源和商品倾销市场,当然还要提供巨量守纪律的廉价劳动力。但是,中国不可以产业升级,不可以危及西方在食物链上的最高端地位。目前来看,中国不愿意全面推行“上海模式”,不愿意步拉美后尘;由于“国进民退”,深圳模式在全国推行的可能性也不大,全面走向“北京模式”的概率最大。这确实是一个结构性矛盾。

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "中国未能形成“公民社会”的历史原因" geschrieben. 19.01.2019

      西方所谓的“公民社会”,是相对独立于国家的,是“民间自治”的,意味着自下而上的自我发展。

      西方为何能形成这样的模式,我想可能与西欧的封建历史有关。在西欧封建社会,国王并非至高无上,他只是一个大一点的贵族而已。国王的权力是受到限制的,其它贵族和诸侯在自己的领地内是相对独立的,国王也不能直接管辖,他们甚至可能有能力挑战国王的权威。西欧在这个封建社会基础上发展,形成后来的民族国家,其国家机器类似于过去的国王,并不是至高无上的,并不能全面和无孔不入地控制社会,社会因而才能够相对独立于国家并自治。这也许是西方“公民社会”的历史基础之一。

      国王的权力,除了被贵族和诸侯分担,另外也受制于教会。国王掌握世俗权力,而教会却拥有精神权力。在中世纪,精神权力甚至高于世俗权力,国王和皇帝也得由教皇来加冕。

      也就是说,作为最高世俗权力的代表,国王却受到贵族诸侯和基督教会的双重制约和挑战,根本就谈不上什么至高无上。

      此外,西方“公民社会”的理论传统还可以追溯到洛克。洛克的思想认为,人的自然权利,包括生命、财产和自由,不能受到国家的威胁和侵犯。

      但是,中国历史的情况却大不相同,历史上就是大一统和中央集权,并非真正欧洲意义上的封建社会。而且,中国历史上的皇权至高无上,不容任何挑战,在皇权的严密专制统治下,民间社会还有多少独立空间呢?还能在多大程度上自治呢?因此,没有出现类似于西方的公民社会,也就不奇怪了。当然,也有人会说,在中国过去的王朝,皇帝的统治一般只到县一级,县以下是乡绅自治。这也许有道理,但是乡绅自治并不代表相对独立于皇权,也只能存在于皇权允许范围之内,绝不允许制约和挑战皇权,这与西欧历史是根本不同的。要不怎么说“普天之下,莫非王土;率土之滨,莫非王臣”呢?

      毛在1949年建政后,就仿效苏联建立起一个极权国家,通过单位制和户口制,对全社会进行直达最基层的严密控制。按照毛的说法,就是“党政军民学,东西南北中,党是领导一切的”,其实这就是毛对“普天之下,莫非王土;率土之滨,莫非王臣”的现代解读。在毛时期,是谈不上任何“公民社会”可能性的,民间的活力被严重束缚和压抑。

      此外,在中国历史上,宗教从来就没有像西欧中世纪时期那样重要。在西欧,上帝高于皇帝,教会能够制约甚至高于世俗权力。而中国皇帝的另一个头衔是“天子”,是天命所归,皇帝与上帝同为一体,世俗权力和精神权力集于一身。

      因此,在中国,由皇权演化而来的现代国家机器,也顺理成章是至高无上、无所不在且不容挑战的。对这一点,统治者和被统治者都认为天经地义。一个独立于国家的“公民社会”,是很难想象的。

      今日之中国,尚介于“党国”(Parteistaat)和民国(Bürgerstaat)之间。从“党国”到“民国”,中间还隔着一个成熟的“公民社会”。

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "A Study of Employment of CPEC Energy Projects: China is Hijacking Jobs or Creating Jobs?" geschrieben. 15.01.2019

      Introduction
      China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a “flagship project” of China’s entire Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Mardell and Eder, 2018). Up to $55 billion will be invested in the CPEC, which was launched in 2014 and which China recently described as the “fastest and most effective” of all its BRI projects. CPEC involves expanding Gwadar port, and constructing energy pipelines, power plants (which alone cost $35 billion), hundreds of miles of highways and high-speed railways, fiber-optic cables and special economic zones (Chandran, 2018).

      Since the launch of BRI in 2013, China has made extraordinary progress. However, there also have been a lot of criticisms against China’s approaches of carrying out BRI projects. One of the biggest complaints is that there's a lack of local employment opportunities and excessive reliance on Chinese employees for on-the-ground projects, which deprives participating countries of jobs (Chandran, 2018). In November 2016, an Indian political commentator, Ashok Malik (on August 2017 he became the Press Secretary to the President of India), argued that “Chinese money goes not to locals but is transferred from a state-owned Chinese bank or credit institution to a state-run or state-associated Chinese infrastructure company that executes the project using Chinese workers (Malik, 2016).” On October 18, 2017, the then-US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson criticized China that “they don’t often create the jobs, which infrastructure projects should be tremendous job creators in these economies, but too often foreign workers are brought in to execute these infrastructure projects (CSIS, 2017).” In June 2018, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad complained that he was against investments in which “the contract goes to China, and Chinese contractors prefer to use their own workers from China, use everything imported from China, even the payment is not made here. It’s made in China. So, we gain nothing at all (Ibrahim and Jaipragas, 2018).” Jeff Smith from the American think-tank, the Heritage Foundation, asserted that “the BRI can represent a one-way street: Participating nations assume large sums of Chinese debt and pay high rates of interest to Chinese financial institutions to compensate Chinese firms using Chinese materials and Chinese workers whose earnings are cycled back into the Chinese economy (Smith, 2018).”

      Therefore, in terms of creating local jobs, there is a public perception that there will be no obvious benefits when cooperating with China to construct infrastructure projects. However, according to estimation from China’s Ministry of Commerce, as of May 2017, China has invested more than $50 billion in BRI countries since 2013 and Chinese businesses have built fifty-six economic and trade cooperation zones, generating nearly $1.1 billion in tax revenue and creating 180,000 local jobs (Liu, 2018). On December 27, 2018, China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of State Council (SASAC) and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences co-released an industry report named Research Report on Overseas Social Responsibility of Central Enterprises. According to this report, China’s central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are stimulating job markets of economies involved in BRI, as a growing number of them are enhancing their employment mechanisms aside from increasing job opportunities. Until end of 2018, these central SOEs have hired more than 360 thousand local employees in all BRI host countries (People.cn, 2019).

      Therefore, what are the facts in the host countries of BRI? Is China hijacking jobs or creating jobs? This essay tries to answer this question by studying the employment of CPEC energy projects.

      The Demography and Labor Forces of Pakistan
      Pakistan is the fifth most populous country in the world with a population of 207 millions, it is also one of the world’s largest youth bulge country with 48 percent population aged 15-49. In terms of the size of the labor forces, Pakistan is the 10th largest country in the world. In 2012/2013, the number of unemployed people was 3.73 million out of the total labor forces of 59.74 million (MoF Pakistan, 2015). Given the very large scale of Chinese investments on CPEC, both the government and the people of Pakistan have very high expectations that CPEC will boost Pakistani economic development and create tremendous job opportunities.

      Employment Opportunities of CPEC as a Whole
      According to estimation from “the News International” of Pakistan, CPEC will create around two million direct and indirect new jobs (The News International, 2016). Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) Chairman Dostain Khan Jamaldini said that the port city alone would be able to create over 40,000 jobs having more capacity of job opportunities in future (Business plus, 2016). According to The CPEC Portal, until June 2017, CPEC has created over 38,000 jobs, of which 30,000 have been secured by locals. The 17 early harvest projects of CPEC, of which 11 are in implementation already, have become a source of direct and indirect employment, and more than 75% jobs are available for locals (The CPEC Portal, 2017).

      Sahiwal Coal Power Plant Project
      Sahiwal Coal Power Plant is regarded as one of the early harvest projects under CPEC. The project was launched by two Chinese state-owned enterprises, Huaneng Shandong and Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co., Ltd., with the share of 50% each. However, Shandong Huaneng Company is responsible for the operation of the Power Plant. It is a 2x660 MW power plant with the utilization of the most advanced technologies, and has the capacity to generate over nine billion KHW of electricity annually, which is enough to meet demand of over 10 million households. The founding ceremony of this project took place on July 31st, 2015 and was completed in a period of 22 months and 6 days, ahead of the deadline of the contract (Zia and Waqar, 2018a).

      Zia and Waqar (2018a) have visited this project and collected the data and information of employment as the following:

      Constructional Phase
      The total direct jobs created during the constructional phase of this project were almost 6,500, among them 2,730 (42%) were Pakistani domestic workers and 3,770 (58%) were from China. By major occupational groups, the total number of workers hired in Pakistan on professional and managerial posts (having relevant experience of 5 years) was 45 (31%) while the rest 100 (69%) workers were hired from China. 350 (30%) of all technical/skilled labors were hired in Pakistan, in contrast, 800 (70%) from China. Meanwhile, 1,400 (82.36%) semiskilled and 200 (57%) administration staff were also hired in China. However, more unskilled workers (60%) were hired in Pakistan, namely 1,845. The following figures give us a clear picture of the composition and breakdown of the labor forces during the constructional phase:


      Figure 1. Labor Composition in Constructional Phase of Sahiwal Coal Power Plant


      Figure 2. Labor Breakdown in Constructional Phase of Sahiwal Coal Power Plant

      According to Zia and Waqar (2018a), the main reason for this composition is the unavailability of required skills of Pakistani domestic labor forces. Hence, the management of the Chinese enterprises was forced to hire labors from China which certainly cost them more in terms of wage, security, insurance and other travelling costs. For unskilled jobs there were actually more Pakistani workers than Chinese workers.

      Operational Phase
      The total direct jobs created during the operational phase are 1,779, from which 1,108 (62.3%) are the Pakistani domestic labors while 671 (37.7%) were from China.

      There were five major occupational groups: 29 (40%) Pakistani workers were hired for professional and managerial posts, while the left 42 (60%) were from abroad, summing up a total number of 71 executive managers. The number of technical labors hired in Pakistan were 219 (44%) in contrast to 272 (66%) foreigners. However, 457 (59%) semiskilled, 172 (100%) unskilled and 231 (86%) administration staffs were hired in Pakistan during the operational phase of the plant. The following figures give us a clear picture of the composition and breakdown of the labor forces during the operational phase:


      Figure 3. Labor Composition in Operational Phase of Sahiwal Coal Power Plant


      Figure 4. Labor Breakdown in Operational Phase of Sahiwal Coal Power Plant

      As the plant is super-critical and utilizes various advanced technologies, the skills of Pakistani labor forces are insufficient to meet the requirements of operating this modern power plant. Therefore the Chinese preferred to employ and train fresh qualified engineers from numerous engineering universities in Pakistan to address this problem. The first batch was fully hired from University of Engineering and Technology Lahore (UET) and National University of Sciences and Technology Islamabad (NUST). The graduates hired from UET were 80 to 90 out of 124 engineers, while the rest were the graduates of NUST. However, the next recruitment in 2016 was selected from almost all the major universities of Pakistan. Soon after the recruitment, the employees were sent to China for six months of technical training. After returning to Pakistan, they were sent to UET to complete a specially designed 12-module program. All of these candidates have returned back until August 2017 to operate the plant. Currently, the most Chinese workers are working in the maintenance department; all of them shall leave Pakistan within three years. Therefore, around 100 Pakistani domestic workers have been hired in 2017 in order to take over the work of the Chinese in the maintenance department. The plant planned to hire 100 additional Pakistani domestic workers in 2018 for the same purpose.

      Meanwhile, Zia and Waqar (2018a) have also observed that national and international training as well as workshop seminars had been organized, job promotion was fairly awarded without nationality based bias or discrimination. Overall, the leaders are developed from within the plant.

      The above analysis focuses on the direct jobs created under this project. However, the plant has further sub-contractors which are required to accomplish other tasks including security and coal intake from the railways to the coal mill etc. These requirements also create many indirect jobs for Pakistani people.

      Employment of the 16 CPEC Energy Projects
      There are totally 16 energy projects under CPEC. According to Rashid et al. (2018), if taking Sahiwal power plant as a benchmark for the upcoming projects, the number of jobs to be created during the constructional phase is estimated to be 50,828, while 22,900 jobs have been created under 5 energy projects which include coal power plant as well as hydro projects. Thus, totally 73,728 jobs will be created under these energy projects. Among them around 30,966 (42%) would be Pakistani workers while around 42,762 (58%) would be Chinese workers who are more than local labors. However, given that many Pakistani graduates have already gained the required skills during the construction of Sahiwal Coal Power Plant and other projects, and the Chinese investors are planning to decrease the number of Chinese employees by further providing training to Pakistani labors, therefore it is expected that the number of Pakistani workers during operational phase would be much higher than that of Chinese workers, and the percentage of Pakistani workers of all the energy projects during operational phase could be also higher than that of the Sahiwal Coal Power Plant which is a early harvest project.

      Comparison with CPEC Road Infrastructure Projects
      Zia and Waqar (2018b) have also studied six CPEC and related road infrastructure projects. The results show that approximately 52,000 direct jobs have been created under these projects. Among them only 7% are Chinese workers. Hence, the outcome of their study negates the impression that only the Chinese are getting the employment in CPEC projects. According to this result, Zia and Waqar (2018b) made a conclusion that the criticisms of hijacking job market by Chinese nationals are usually based on perception and political statements, which should be overlooked and changed to focus towards the long-term and sustainable development, growth and prosperity of Pakistan.

      Compared to these road projects, obviously the percentage of Chinese workers in the energy projects are much higher. The reason could be that energy projects are more technology-intensive than road projects, and there is still big gap between the skills of Pakistani labor forces and the technical and managerial demands of these energy projects, therefore the investors had to bring qualified labor forces from China to Pakistan.

      Conclusion
      China’s approaches of implementing its ambitious BRI strategy have caused deep concern that it is not interested in creating jobs for host countries, instead, China prefers to bring large-scale Chinese labor forces to these countries to carry out BRI projects. However, the results of studying CPEC energy projects show that this perception does not entirely fit the facts. Although there are more Chinese workers than Pakistani labor forces during constructional phases of these energy projects, but this could be due to the skill deficits of Pakistani labor forces. During operational phase of these power plants, much more Pakistani workers are hired than Chinese workers. The Chinese investors are also training and empowering Pakistani locals so that Chinese workers could return to their home when Pakistani workers are able to take over the entire operation. Compared to more technology-intensive energy projects, the percentage of Pakistan domestic workers in the CPEC road infrastructure projects is much higher; this fact also negates the perception that China is not willing to create jobs for host countries of the BRI projects. On the other hand, there is still room for the Chinese enterprises of carrying out BRI projects to improve the fulfillment of their social responsibilities; knowledge transfer and empowerment of the local workforces should be continued and enhanced.

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      Zia, M and Waqar, S (2018a) Insights of Employment of CPEC Energy Projects, CPEC Quarterly Spring Issue-2018. Available at: http://www.cpec.gov.pk/brain/public/uplo...Magazine2-2.pdf (accessed January 14, 2019).

      Zia, M and Waqar, S (2018b) Employment Generation and Labour Composition in CPEC and Related Road Infrastructure Projects, Centre of Excellence-CPEC. Available at: https://cpec-centre.pk/wp-content/upload...re-Projects.pdf (accessed January 14, 2019).


    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "Poor Trump and Powerful Xi" geschrieben. 10.01.2019

      I have just watched Donald Trump's first national address on border wall and government shutdown, and the immediate response from Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer.

      What a poor President of the United States! This is my perception. Trump is demanding $5 billion in border wall funding. Come on! Only 5 billion USD, it is just a small money, but as the President of the richest and strongest country of the entire world, Trump has to actually use all his means to convince or "force" the congress to approve his plan, even at the price of government shutdown.

      As the head of state and chief of government, the power of American President seems very limited. Is that the so-called “check and balance”? With such limited power, how can he "Make America Great Again"? Compared to poor Trump, obviously our President Xi is far more powerful. Look at China’s unprecedentedly ambitious “Belt and Road Initiative”! This grand strategy spans over 60 countries and will cost over a trillion dollars. Early in 2013, our powerful President declared his decision, but he did not need an approval from the National People’s Congress at all. Who is more powerful? President Xi is probably better equipped to achieve "the great renaissance of the Chinese nation". If Trump were smart enough, he should turn to China! 5 billion dollars are nothing for rich China. Trump should make a deal with China to end the trade war which he started. If so, he would need neither Mexico nor Congress to pay for his wall, China will pay everything. Moreover, China is very good at infrastructure building, in this respect China could also offer its help. Who has built the Great Wall?

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "The workload at Huawei and China's development" geschrieben. 05.01.2019

      Everyone knows, the workload at Huawei is extremely heavy. I cannot deny this judgment because I really worked overtime very often at Huawei, especially when I was working in the R&D! At that time I used to arrive in office at 9am and leave office at 11pm. NO weekend at all! And I was not the most hardworking one. The life was then really tough, but Huawei also offered what a young and ambitious man aspired to, namely good pay, opportunities for career promotion, exciting projects, travelling worldwide and working with outstanding people, and so on. I must emphasize, I have no intention to argue in favor of overtime work. For personal life and health, too much overtime work and too heavy workload are really bad and even could be dangerous. However, for China and Chinese young people, do we really have a better choice other than hard work?

      Why has China achieved an unprecedented economic miracle in the past 40 years? Its large, disciplined and skilled labor forces are exactly one of the reasons. The American President Trump claimed, "We have rebuilt China". Did he mean the American people were also one part of the hardworking Chinese labor forces? I belonged to the labor forces previously, but please, I was not the cheap and unskilled labor force, but very good educated one. In 1978 China was still a poor agricultural country, unlike Western Europe, the USA and Japan, China was a latecomer in modernization and without any colony. Therefore, I can hardly imagine China had any other means other than the ruthless and thorough exploitation of its huge demographic dividend to finalize its industrialization and the subsequent industrial upgrade.

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "中国正在重返帝国之路吗?" geschrieben. 26.12.2018

      Gunter Schubert教授是德国知名的东亚问题专家,图宾根大学教授。他来柏林讲学,题目是:“The return of an empire – China’s asia policy in the Xi Jiping era(重返帝国,中国在习近平时代的亚洲政策)”。他认为,在习治下,中国正在重返帝国,他引经据典,头头是道。哈哈,难道这就是传说中的"中国威胁论",既然被我遇见了,那就不得不挑战一下。我对这名教授说,我理解的帝国,其重要特征在于,它们拥有广泛的海外利益,并且为了捍卫和扩张这些利益,它们会在必要时动用军事力量。历史上典型的帝国,如大英帝国,拥有遍布全球的殖民地,而且以武力为后盾统治这些殖民地;美国也是这样一个全球性帝国,有遍布全球的军事基地,当美国利益受到威胁时,美军无疑是坚强后盾,美国多次毫不犹豫地动用其强大军事机器维护和攫取海外利益;前苏联同样是这样一个有全球利益的典型帝国。

      而所谓崛起中的“中华帝国”,却并没有海外军事基地(不要拿吉布提说事,那儿只是一个补给中心,远远谈不上作战基地),大规模远程军事投送能力严重不足。这个“中华帝国”,连台湾也拿不下,北朝鲜也搞不定,它的“扩张”,很大程度只是做生意,很多还是赔本生意。所以,中国目前绝不是世界历史上的典型帝国,把中国称为“帝国”,是对中国的复兴的误读,也是对中国能力的高估。

      对我的质疑和挑战,Schubert教授回应说,中国也可能是一种新的方式实施帝国扩张,不是基于武力而是基于协商的方式。

      我说,如果中国以和平方式谋求扩大海外经济利益的行为是“帝国扩张”的话,那么德国作为欧盟的主导国家,在欧盟是同样的作为,难道德国也是一个欧盟内的“帝国”吗。所以,对崛起中的中国,更合适的定义不是“帝国”(empire),而是“领导力”(leadership)或“领袖国家”(leading nation)。

      对于我的挑战,该教授也无法正面反对。

      感想:中国的发展招致多方质疑和不安,但我们似乎并未能进行有效澄清和反制。我们并不缺理论家和思想家,但似乎缺乏能在国际场合清楚阐述自己思想理论的人。外语还是短板呀,在中文成为与英语比肩的世界通用语言之前,中国的专家学者,还得加把劲把外语能力提上去。

      不过,看到他们说中国现在是“帝国”,说心里话,我还是很高兴的,尽管中国实际不是。但没办法,我就是高兴,我说不定也是一个“帝国主义者”。“帝国扩张”,是一件多么激动人心的事!那是一股多么昂扬向上的力量!多么高尚健康的乐趣!不过,关键问题是:谁在“扩张”?

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "Formal institutionalization and informal network of relations" geschrieben. 25.12.2018

      In 2010, I became the managing director of Huawei Software Business Unit in Western Europe. At that time the business development of our department was still in early stage, and the operational management was also at a low level. But I was very ambitious and launched a quite radical reform in order to make great achievements in a short time. Of course my motivation was to secure the chance of my own promotion.

      When I took over this Business Unit, all of its country managers and heads of business divisions were Chinese, there was no any European employee occupying a leadership position. Therefore I promoted many European employees to take over leading positions. Meanwhile, I tried to institutionalize the operation of our department by establishing a mechanism of bi-weekly voice conference across all the countries in Western Europe region. In the past, the official language of our department meetings was Chinese, thus, our European colleagues had no chance to participate the departmental management and decision-making at all. I realized this would restrict the potential of our European colleagues, therefore I changed the meeting language to English. Many Chinese managers were reluctant to speak English because they thought the efficiency of communication would be greatly reduced, but I was unmoved by such arguments and forced them speak English during the bi-weekly meetings. After carrying out these reform measures, the European colleagues were more heavily involved in the departmental management and business development. The effects were obvious, our revenue increased 100% after only one year!

      I paid very much attention to the formal institutionalization of departmental management and was heavily involved in business development, but unfortunately I have ignored the importance of establishing and maintaining informal network of relations. The result proved to be fatal. Many Chinese managers were against me, and I also failed to win the recognition from my boss. Although I have made an unprecedented business achievement in Western Europe, I was not promoted, but replaced by another Chinese manager. After he took over my position, he immediately cancelled the bi-weekly voice conference call and changed the meeting language back to Chinese. He did not care about the formal institutionalization and localization, but I have to admit, he was very good at building informal network of relations which really plays a decisive role in an Chinese organization. Many Chinese managers praised him, and his boss also recognized him, finally, he was promoted to a higher position. Several years later, I left Huawei, now I heard that the business performance of my previous department was getting worse and worse, so that it was no longer an independent Business Unit.

      Today, when I look back the reform I pushed for, it can be regarded as an attempt of institutionalization. I don’t think my efforts were wrong, institutionalization is absolutely important for any large organization, however, you can’t ignore the importance of informal network of relations, especially in an Chinese organization!

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "Strategic partnership between China and Germany: crisis-proof and future-proof?" geschrieben. 25.12.2018

      Today I have read a paper written by Michael Staack in March 2018, a professor of political science at the Helmut-Schmidt-Universität/Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg(汉堡德国国防军大学). This paper is with the title “Strategische Partnerschaft zwischen China und Deutschland: Krisenfest und zukunftstauglich?” (Strategic partnership between China and Germany: crisis-proof and future-proof? 中德战略伙伴关系 – 经得起危机和时间的考验?)
      After reading this paper I realized the relations between Germany and China are not so fragile and unstable as I thought before. Actually we should not overestimate the importance of the ideological differences between the two countries. Instead, the both share quite a lot of common interests: economical, political and even strategic. In my opinion, today’s foreign policies of the both countries follow to a greater extend the institutionalism of the international relation theories, which is quite different from the realistic, nationalistic and unilateral approach of the USA under the leadership of President Trump.

      I used to believe Germany was just the political colony of the USA without basic political independence. This impression could be wrong! At least for some important issues, Germany has bravely taken different positions against the USA. Professor Staack mentioned in his paper an very important political and strategic event. In 2004/2005 the George W. Bush administration of the US had the plan to accept east Asian countries, especially Japan, to join NATO. Given that Japan and China are actually strategic rivals, China must strongly oppose this action. But eventually this plan has not been implemented, one of the most important reasons is that, Germany opposed this idea! The motives for Germany’s attitude are obvious. First, Germany has no interest in taking sides in unresolved territorial conflicts in east Asian region. Secondly, it has very close ties with all the states of the region and therefore has no interest in supporting one regional power against another. And thirdly, from the German point of view, it is highly questionable whether NATO should play any active role in the Asia-Pacific region and whether it is in Germany's foreign and security interest. Therefore, Germany actually has its own positions in terms of foreign policies and strategies. Recently, Germany is not willing to follow the USA and Australia to forbid Huawei’s 5G products and solutions into German market, this is another evidence of Germany’s political independence from the US.

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "Are Germany and China natural partner?" geschrieben. 25.12.2018

      I need to write a seminar paper on China's foreign policy, now I am struggling to find a concrete thesis. I don't want to only focus on China because I am not only a Chinese but also a world citizen, since I have worked in China, India, Africa and Europe for a long time. I really can be regarded as a person with world perspective instead of a narrow nationalist. Therefore, I prefer to write something on Sino-German relations. Professor Lian Yuru from Peking University has argued for a long time, that Germany and China are natural partner, because the two countries actually have no fundamental conflicts, instead, they share many common interests. Professor Lian's argument seems reasonable and meaningful, especially under the condition that the US is probably recalibrating its world strategy. The Trump administration treats China increasingly as its prime competitor, and Germany is no longer the loyal little younger brother of the US as it was during the cold war. The German foreign minister Heiko Mass has openly talked about the necessity of reconsidering Germany's dependence on the US. In this sense, it could be very interesting to study the Sino-German relations under the new conditions. What do you think about this topic? Any suggestions or comments are welcome and appreciated.

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "The US decided to withdraw its troops from Syria" geschrieben. 25.12.2018

      The Trump administration has decided to withdraw its more than 2000 soldiers from Syria, the reason is that "the mission of defeating IS is delivered". I really doubt if the Americans have read my article written on Dec. 1st, 2015 (德军能给叙利亚带去民主吗?). It seems they agree with the approach I have argued.

      The key issue in Syria is to restore the law and order instead of pushing "regime change" to carry out the so called "experiment of democracy". Democracy is indeed a luxury which must be based on the principle of the separation of the religion from the state. Meanwhile, a prosperous, stable and solid middle class is also indispensable. In order to meet these requirements, Syria still has a long way to go. Among all the political forces in Syria, only Assad regime is able to restore the order. If the foreign powers destroyed this regime, the perspective of ending the long lasting civil war would be very gloomy. What happened in Libya? Trump's decision shows us that the Americans have accepted the ruthless fact that Russia and Iran had won this geopolitical competition at this moment. However, it could be also possible that Trump administration is trying to withdraw from the troublesome middle east and mobilize more resources to the so called "indo-pacific" region, in order to contain its prime competitor: CHINA.

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "华为孟晚舟、中美关系与冷战2.0" geschrieben. 09.12.2018

      本周最令人关注的大事之一,就是华为CFO孟晚舟被加拿大警方应美国要求扣留的消息了。美加扣留孟的理由是,华为涉嫌向伊朗出口受到管制的美国技术和产品。为此,孟女士可能被引渡到美国,如果罪名成立,面临最高可达30年的监禁。

      作为一名曾长期在华为工作的前员工,我自然非常关注此事。但是事情发生得比较突然,也比较复杂。所以尽管有朋友问我对此事的看法,但是我还是想多看看、多想想再发表看法。如今消息比较多了,我也觉得有必要说点个人看法了。这个事情为什么会发生?对华为、对中美关系甚至变动中的世界格局又有什么影响呢?

      华为当然不是一家一般的中国公司,而是中国最杰出、最勇猛、最强大的科技企业,没有之一。华为成立三十余年来的成功故事,就是中国过去数十年迅猛发展的缩影。我个人在华为参与的大大小小项目,应该也近百了吧,无论是新兴的发展中国家市场,还是成熟完善的发达国家市场,基本上是百战百胜;不管对手是谁,无论是爱立信、阿尔卡特尔还是国内友商,只要华为下决心要做的项目,一般都能拿下。这并不是自我吹嘘我有多厉害,而是说明华为有全面的核心技术,有一个无比强大的平台,再加上将士用命,执行力非常强悍,就像一支能征惯战的精锐之师,总有一股压倒一切的气势。华为能在全世界除美国以外的ICT市场所向披靡,其三大业务集团(通讯运营商、终端业务和企业业务)齐头并进,今年的业务规模突破1000亿美元,在我这个前华为员工看来,是毫不奇怪的。

      所以,拘捕这样一家堪称中国镇国之宝企业的CFO兼创始人的女儿,无论如何都是一个大动作,是对中国科技和经济的一次精准打击。这次事件,不仅仅是一次司法调查,而且会对中美关系产生重大影响,可以说是一种国际政治行为。

      那么,华为到底有没有向伊朗出售通讯系统呢?这些系统中是否有受到管制的美国技术和产品呢?我个人认为这个问题不难回答。伊朗是一个人口超过8000万的国家,对于这样一个巨大的市场,华为作为一家商业企业,不参与才是奇怪的。通讯系统本身十分复杂,业界任何一家公司都不可能全部自给自足,也没有必要,因此,不用到美国产品和技术是不可能的。不仅仅是华为中兴这样的中国公司,德国公司、日本公司、甚至美国公司,没有不想打入伊朗市场的。在2015年7月伊朗与六国(美俄中英法德)达成核协议后,德国看美国老大对伊立场松动,外交部长和经济部长立马访问伊朗,无非也是垂涎伊朗巨大的市场潜力。可是,自从特朗普当选总统以来,美国国内敌视伊朗的势力掌权,悍然单方面废除伊核协议,不断勒紧套在伊朗脖子上的绞索。因此,德国等国家的公司,也就知趣不去伊朗市场发展了。美国有向伊朗禁运的法规,对违反这些法规的组织和个人实施所谓的“长臂管辖权”,是否合理合法?我不是法律方面的专业人士,所以无法做出评论。我打算从国际关系的角度,来分析一下为何会发生此事,以及可能产生的影响。

      要想搞清楚美国发动这样一个国际政治行为的原因,就要弄明白指导其行动的理论基础,不然我们始终停留在感情用事、就事论事的表面层次,知其然,不知其所以然,无法直达事物的本质。

      西方的国际关系理论,大致可以分为现实主义和自由主义两大流派,当然还有制度主义、建构主义、英国学派和批判理论等等。这些理论视角不同,各有所长,适用于不同的时间和空间。

      现实主义国际关系理论基于四个主要假设:第一,国际体系以国家为基础,国家是国际体系中主要的和统一的行为体。国家是基本的分析单位,国际关系研究就是这些单位之间关系的研究。第二,从悲观主义的人性观出发,国际政治的本质是冲突,即无政府状态下争夺权力的斗争。第三,现实主义理论的核心是国家的生存和安全,因此,在诸多国际问题的排列次序中,国家安全通常处于最高的位置,军事和相关的政治问题支配着世界政治,而经济和社会问题是次要的或低政治问题。第四,国家本质上是根据国家利益进行决策的理性行为体。

      自由主义国际关系理论的基本思想是,国家本身的特征影响国际关系。这与现实主义形成鲜明对比,现实主义者认为,所有国家在本质上都有着相同的目标和行为,都是追求财富或生存的自利主体,至少在国际关系方面是这样的。自由主义国际关系理论的一个突出观点就是,民主国家之间不会发生战争,最早可以追溯到德国哲学家康德的“民主和平论”。Andrew Moravcsik发展了一种更普遍的自由主义国际关系理论,基于三个核心假设:第一,个体和私人集团,而非国家,才是世界政治中的最根本主体,即所谓的“非国家主体”;第二,国家代表并服务于国内占支配地位的集团;第三,这些私人集团的利益偏好决定国家行为。根据自由主义国际关系理论,国家并不仅仅是一个在无政府丛林中追求生存和繁荣的“黑箱”,而是各集团通过特定形式的政府在国际体系中投射其利益的集合体。国家的生存当然仍旧是一个关键的目标,但是商业利益或意识形态信仰也是至关重要的。

      制度主义国际关系理论与现实主义有着不少共同假设,都认为国际体系处于无政府状态,国家是自利的、理性的、追求生存和发展的行为主体。但是,基于微观经济理论和博弈论的制度主义国际关系理论,得出了一个与现实主义南辕北辙的结论:国家之间的合作共存是可能的。这派理论的核心观点是,各国在特定条件下追求合作共存,也是一种理性和自利的战略。现实主义者则怀疑这一点,他们认为国际关系是一种“零和”游戏。制度主义者认为,通过由规则、规范、实践和决策过程等定义的“制度”,国家之间可以克服阻碍合作共存的不确定性。“制度”是国家之间合作共存的保障,也能提升国家之间协商的效率。通过常设性的中央机构,而非临时性的磋商,能有效降低合作共存的成本。制度主义认为,通过建立规则和规范,可以促进国家之间解决纷争并共同合作,这与现实主义对国际法和制度持怀疑态度不同,现实主义认为国际法和制度只是国家行为的一种表现,而非原因;国际法和制度是国际权力平衡的一种反映,不能限制或影响国家行为。换句话说,现实主义认为,追求权力和利益才是国家行为的原因,极端情况下,国家甚至可以抛弃国际法和制度。

      建构主义不能说是一种理论,而是一种研究范式,是一套关于世界、人类行为动机和机构的假设。与建构主义对应的与其说是现实主义、自由主义和制度主义,不如说是理性主义。建构主义从若干方面挑战理性主义。国际关系建构主义者认为,诸如军事权力、贸易关系、国际制度或者国内偏好等利益变量都不重要,因为它们都只是这个世界的客观事实,重要的是这些利益变量的社会意义,而社会意义是由历史、观念、规范和信仰等因素建构的。举个例子,建构主义者认为,尽管英国和中国的核武器威力差不多,但对美国的意义却大不相同。另外,传统上中国的行为符合现实主义国际关系理论,但建构主义者认为,这并不是基于国际体系的客观结构,更多是基于其特别的历史战略文化。

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "Das Sozialkreditsystem in China - Entwicklungen im Pilotprojekt von Chengdu -" geschrieben. 24.11.2018

      Das chinesische Sozialkreditsystem (engl.: Social Credit System, im Folgenden SCS genannt) umfasst derzeit über 40 verschiedene Pilotprojekte. In diesen Projekten wird im Einklang mit der chinesischen Strategie von „Tests im Kleinen – Implementierung im Großen“ auf kommunaler und regionaler Ebene getestet, wie ein zukünftiges SCS für die gesamte Volksrepublik China aussehen könnte. Dabei werden in den verschiedenen Pilotprojekten unterschiedliche Zielgruppen in die Versuchsreihen miteinbezogen und es werden unterschiedliche Anreize und Strafen für die Teilnehmer ausprobiert. Die höchste Planungsstufe des gesamten Projektes ist die im Juni 2014 vom Staatsrat veröffentlichte „Gliederung des Bauplans für ein SCS (2014-2020)“ (社会信用体系建设规划纲要). Im Jahr 2015 ging dann auch die Website „Credit China“ online, die Informationen zum gesamtchinesischen SCS-Projekt bietet. Chengdu ist nun seit 2015 offiziell eine der ersten Demonstrationsstädte für den Aufbau des von der Zentralregierung genehmigten SCS-Pilotprojektes. Als Motivationen der Stadt werden nicht nur die dringende Notwendigkeit, das rasche Voranschreiten der Entwicklung eines Sozialkreditsystems auf nationaler Ebene zu gewährleisten, sondern auch eine gesündere und beschleunigte Entwicklung der Wirtschaft von Chengdu und die Veränderung des wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsmodus genannt.

      Entwicklung:
      Die konkreten Grundlagen der Entwicklung eines SCS sind in Chengdu wesentlich älter als 2015. Bereits 2002 wurden in der Entwicklungsstrategie „Ehrliches Chengdu“ (诚信成都) folgende Ziele festgelegt, die im Weitesten mit den Zielen eines nationalen SCS übereinstimmen: Erstens sollten Ehrlichkeit und Vertrauen in der Gesellschaft gefördert werden. Zweitens sollten Unternehmen dazu gebracht werden, sich an geltendes Recht sowie ihre eigenen Versprechen zu halten. Drittens sollte die Regierung Vorreiter und Entscheider im Kreditsystem sein. Viertens wird die Oberaufsicht über das Kreditsystem festgelegt. Dabei wurde betont, dass zuerst die rechtlichen Grundlagen geschaffen werden müssen, gefolgt von der Errichtung von Plattformen. Nach Abschluss dieser beiden Arbeitsschritte könne mit der schrittweisen Implementierung und Verbesserung begonnen werden. Der erste Schritt hin zu einem wirklichen SCS wurde 2014 von der Provinzregierung von Sichuan durch die Veröffentlichung des „Bauplans für das Sozialkreditsystem der Provinz Sichuan 2014 - 2020“ (四川省社会信用体系建设规划(2014—2020年)) getan. Ein Jahr später folgte auf Bezirksebene der „Bauplan für das Sozialkreditsystem in Chengdu 2015 - 2020“ (成都市社会信用体系建设规划(2015—2020年)), der ausführlich alle Details zum SCS in Chengdu regelt.

      Implementierung:
      Nachdem die Richtlinien von der Zentralregierung zunächst auf Provinz- und dann auf Bezirksebene kamen, wurde dort in Chengdu mit der Umsetzung begonnen. Dem Plan entsprechend war der erste Schritt die Schaffung rechtlicher Grundlagen und Regularien. So wurden beispielsweise „Maßnahmen zur Verwaltung von Unternehmensinformationen in Chengdu“ (成都市企业信用信息管理办法), „Verwaltungsvorschriften für Daten von Kreditvermittlern“ (成都市中介机构信用信息管理规定) und „Standards für Daten in der SCS Plattform“ (信用信息资源平台数据规范) als zentrale Elemente beschlossen. Nachdem diese Grundlagen gelegt wurden, fuhr die Stadtregierung fort, unterstützende Regularien einzuführen. Dazu gehören zum Beispiel die folgenden: „Aufteilung von öffentlichen Kreditinformationen über Unternehmen“ (企业公共信用等级划分), „Datenelemente der Plattform für Kreditinformationen“ (信用信息资源平台数据元), „Maßnahmen für das Kredit-Informationsmanagement der Stadt Chengdu“ (成都市房地产行业信用信息管理办法), „Kreditstandards für die Immobilienbranche in Chengdu“ (成都市房地产行业信用记分标准) und die „Übergangsmaßnahmen für die Verwaltung der Kreditratings von kleinen und mittelständischen Unternehmen“ (中小企业信用评级管理暂行办法). Die Evaluierung fand unter anderem durch „Umsetzungsgutachten zur Einrichtung einer Demonstrationsstadt für den Bau eines Sozialkreditsystems in Chengdu (2015 - 2016)“ (成都市创建社会信用体系建设示范城市实施意见(2015-2016年)) statt. Durch diese Maßnahmen wurde ein umfassender Referenzstandard für die Erhebung, Nutzung und Überwachung von Kreditinformationen in der Stadt geschaffen, der die Unparteilichkeit und Gleichheit der unterschiedlichen Teilnehmer am SCS garantieren soll.

      Umfang und Reichweite:
      Der Stand 2016 bezüglich der Reichweite des SCS in Chengdu lässt sich wie folgt darstellen: Rund 900.000 Marktteilnehmer aus ‚normalen‘ Haushalten und 36.000 Schlüsselpersonen (z.B. mit besonderer Ausbildung oder großem Einfluss) wurden erfasst. Eine konkrete Zahl für Unternehmen, NGOs und Regierungsbehörden liegt mir bisher nicht vor. Per 2016 wurden zudem insgesamt rund 30 Millionen Kreditdatensätze im SCS erfasst. Zum Vergleich: Die Einwohnerzahl Chengdus beträgt mindestens 15 Millionen. Die zum Pilotprojekt gehörende Website wurde im täglichen Durchschnitt rund 12.000 Mal aufgerufen.

      Digitalisierung:
      Die oben erwähnte Website ist quasi das Herzstück des SCS-Projektes in Chengdu. Hier kann jeder Nutzer, ob Privatperson oder Unternehmen, eine Vielzahl an Informationen über das SCS erhalten. Dabei ist es unerheblich, ob man über eine in- oder ausländische Verbindung auf die Website zugreift. Die Hauptseite bietet ein Suchfeld, in dem man anhand verschiedener Merkmale (z.B. Name, Kreditnummer oder sonstige Schlüsselbegriffe) nach Unternehmen, juristischen Personen, Organisationen oder Institutionen suchen kann. Über dem Menüpunkt „Kredittrends“ (信用动态) bekommt man Zugriff auf verschiedene Nachrichten bezüglich des SCS. Die Nachrichten kann man sich entsprechend der Verwaltungsebene für Chengdu, Sichuan und die VR China anzeigen lassen. Der Punkt „Policy Regulierungen“ (政策法规) führt zu einer Reihe von Bekanntmachungen; hier können aber nur Informationen aus Chengdu selbst angezeigt werden. Der Bereich „Kreditservice“ (信用服务) bietet allerhand weitere Möglichkeiten, um nach Personen zu suchen, die sich verschiedene Vergehen zuschulden kommen lassen haben – von Wortbruch im geschäftlichen Bereich bis zu groben Rechtsverletzung oder Steuervergehen. Insgesamt betrachtet wirkt die Website sehr benutzerfreundlich und intuitiv bedienbar. Interessiert man sich zum Beispiel nur für die Ereignisse in der eigenen Nachbarschaft, so kann man sich alle Bekanntmachungen sowie rote und schwarze Listen auch nach Stadtteilen gegliedert ansehen. Dafür muss man lediglich einmal auf die Karte von Chengdu klicken. Zudem lässt sich feststellen, dass der Austausch zwischen verschiedenen Pilotprojekten auf der Website bereits teilweise funktioniert. Einerseits sind die Websites anderer Pilotprojekte verlinkt, andererseits kann man sich unter dem Menüpunkt „Regionale Verkettung“ (区域联动) direkt Informationen über Personen oder Firmen aus einige anderen Pilotprojekten ansehen. Auswählbare Städte sind zum Beispiel Hangzhou, Deyang oder Luzhou.

      Besonders ist auch die Integration der Website beziehungsweise der Daten in andere Systeme. Neben der Hauptwebsite gibt es eine mobile und etwas eingeschränkte Version derselben sowie vier mobile Applikationen zum Download. Zwei davon sind direkt als IOS- und Android-Apps für das Handy zu benutzen, zwei sind als Integration in andere Portale (WeChat und Weimenhu (微门户)) nutzbar. Zum Stand der beiden Apps und der Weimenhu-Integration kann ich keine Angaben machen, aber die WeChat-Integration bietet praktischen Zugriff auf Bekanntmachungen, Nachrichten, sowie rote und schwarze Listen. Vorteilhaft ist dabei, dass man nicht erst eine App herunterladen muss und genau wie für die Website keine Anmeldung oder ein Zugriff aus China beziehungsweise via VPN erforderlich sind.

      Rote und schwarze Listen:
      Das Pilotprojekt Chengdu arbeitet explizit mit der Veröffentlichung von roten und schwarzen Listen. Diese sind von verschiedenen Menüpunkten der Website aufrufbar und werden dadurch im Webauftritt gut fokussiert. Die roten Listen, die besonders kreditwürdiges und gesetzeskonformes Verhalten loben, sind sehr vielfältig: Es gibt rote Listen für verschiedene Geschäftsbereiche, Listen die nur für einen Stadtteil von Chengdu, und Listen in denen öffentliche Institutionen ausgezeichnet werden. Ähnlich divers sind auch die schwarzen Listen.

      Hier kann man Listen von Firmen, denen bald die Betriebserlaubnis entzogen wird, finden oder Auflistungen von Steuer-Sündern. Hervorheben sollte man, dass auf den schwarzen Listen häufig sowohl das konkrete Vergehen einer Firma oder Person, die rechtliche Grundlage für den Eintrag in die Liste und auch das Gericht findet, was die Anordnung dafür gegeben hat. Auffällig ist außerdem, dass die Abschreckung der schwarzen Listen wesentlich mehr genutzt werden als die Anreize der roten. Mit Stand 24.11.2018 gab es 198 Einträge für rote Listen und 303 Einträge bei den schwarzen Listen.10 Beide Listenformen sind in der Regel online einsehbar (meist in Form von Scans oder Listen) und auch zum Download als Excel-Liste oder PDF-Datei verfügbar. Hier zwei Beispiele für je eine rote und eine schwarze Liste:

      In dieser roten Liste wird eine staatliche Netzagentur für die korrekte Überweisung der Steuern und die guten Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Beziehungen gelobt:


      Die folgende Liste entstand durch die Entscheidung des Gerichtes in Xinjin, (新津) Unternehmen, die gegen eine Vorschrift verstoßen und die daraufhin angeordneten Bußgelder nicht gezahlt haben, in dieser schwarzen Liste aufzuführen.


      Literaturverzeichnis:

      www.creditchina.gov.cn/ ; Die Website ist momentan nicht zu erreichen, wenn man ein herkömmliches Antivirenprogramm nutzt, da eine Warnung vor Trojanern erscheint.

      ZHENG Jie (郑洁), YU Lixia (余丽霞); Das Chengdu-Modell für Sozialkreditsysteme - Wahlmöglichkeiten und politische Empfehlungen (成都市社会信用体系建设模式 - 选择及政策建议); in Financial Forum (金融论坛); März 2018; DOI:10.16127/j.cnki.issn1003-1812.2018.03.009; S.38

      https://www.cdcredit.gov.cn/www/index.html#/home

      https://www.cdcredit.gov.cn/www/index.ht...sList/1/01/1/10

      https://www.cdcredit.gov.cn/www/index.ht.../creditServices

      https://www.cdcredit.gov.cn/www/index.html#/m///districtMap

      https://www.cdcredit.gov.cn/www/index.ht...ewsList/3//1/10

      Screenshot des unter https://www.cdcredit.gov.cn/www/index.ht...8f6/DESC0002/3/ heruntergeladenen Word-Dokuments, 24.11.2018

      Screenshot des unter https://www.cdcredit.gov.cn/www/index.ht...58b/DESC0002/4/ heruntergeladenen Word-Dokuments, 24.11.2018

    • Chaoting Cheng hat den Blog-Artikel "Das soziale Kreditsystem Chinas: Ursprung, Entwicklung und Perspektiven" geschrieben. 20.11.2018

      1949 wurde die Volksrepublik China gegründet. Das neue Regime schuf nach dem Vorbild der Sowjetunion ein System der Planwirtschaft. Mit der Einführung der Planwirtschaft hat China ein Danwei-System (Arbeitseinheit, 单位) in den Städten etabliert und gefördert. Eine Danwei oder Arbeitseinheit war nicht nur ein Arbeitgeber, sondern übernahm auch soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen wie medizinische Versorgung und stellte Wohnraum, Bildung und Renten zur Verfügung. Die meisten Anwohner von Städten gehörten zu einer bestimmten Danwei und ihre Freiheit war streng beschränkt. Darüber hinaus war die Danwei ein wichtiges Werkzeug Pekings zur politischen Mobilisierung und zur Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Durch das System der Danwei erstreckte sich die Kontrolle des Staates auf alle Ecken des Landes und auf jeden Bereich des sozialen Lebens. Die gesamte Gesellschaft war straff organisiert und integriert. Das System der Danwei war das Produkt des hochkonzentrierten politischen Systems und des Wirtschaftssystems der Mao-Ära. Es war auch der Eckpfeiler der Verwaltung und Kontrolle des chinesischen Regimes über die industrielle und städtische Bevölkerung.

      Obwohl die effektive Kontrolle der industriellen und städtischen Bevölkerung durch das Danwei-System erreicht wurde, lebte die Mehrheit der chinesischen Bevölkerung während der Mao-Zeit in ländlichen Gebieten. Wie verwaltet man eine große ländliche Bevölkerung? Maos Antwort war das Hukou-System (Wohnsitzregistrierung, 户口) und die sich daraus ergebende Doppelstruktur zwischen Stadt und Land. Das strikte Hukou-System beschränkt nicht nur die Mobilität der städtischen Bevölkerung, sondern bindet auch die ländliche Bevölkerung an den ländlichen Lebensraum. Für die Bevölkerung mit einer landwirtschaftlichen Hukou ist es sehr schwierig, zur nicht-landwirtschaftlichen Hukou zu wechseln. Theoretisch kann man in die Stadt ziehen, um dadurch mehr Wohlfahrtsvorteile zu bekommen, wenn man sich der Armee anschließt, an einer Universität studiert oder von einem Staatsbetrieb rekrutiert wird, aber nur sehr wenige Bürger haben derartige Möglichkeiten.

      In der Mao-Ära hatte die Bevölkerung aufgrund des Hukou-Systems und des Danwei-Systems nur sehr eingeschränkte Migrations-, Aufenthalts- und Beschäftigungsfreiheit. Aber es ermöglichte dem Staat, eine strikte und wirksame Kontrolle über die Gesellschaft und die Bürger auszuüben. Seit der Reform und Öffnung im Jahr 1978 hat sich dieses stark zentralisierte politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Kontrollsystem jedoch gelockert und die sozialistische Marktwirtschaft hat die Planwirtschaft allmählich abgelöst. Während des Reformprozesses wurden die ursprünglich von der Danwei ausgeübten Funktionen der Sozialversicherung und -kontrolle allmählich an die Regierung und die Gesellschaft abgegeben. Zwischen den Arbeitseinheiten ist der Jobwechsel normal geworden und die Arbeitseinheiten sind nicht mehr in der Lage, den Jobwechsel strikt einzuschränken und die Mitarbeiter vollständig zu kontrollieren. Obwohl zwischen Städten und ländlichen Gebieten immer noch ein striktes Hukou-System besteht, hat die rasche Entwicklung von Industrialisierung und Urbanisierung dazu geführt, dass die Bauern, die an das Land gebunden waren, nun in großem Umfang in die Städte strömen und sich die starre Stadt-Land-Dualitätsstruktur stark gelockert hat.

      Daher wurden die beiden Säulen des sozialen Managements und der Kontrolle in der Mao-Ära, das Danwei-System und das Hukou-System, in der Ära der Reform und Öffnung allmählich geschwächt oder sind sogar zusammengebrochen. Aufgrund des gierigen Strebens nach wirtschaftlichem Gewinn sind häufig Krisen des innergesellschaftlichen Vertrauens ausgebrochen, beispielsweise durch Probleme mit der Lebensmittel- und Arzneimittelsicherheit, Umweltverschmutzungsprobleme und Schuldenrückzahlungsprobleme sowie das beispiellose Ausmaß sozialer Mobilität. All dies führt dazu, dass Peking einem extrem schwierigen Problem der Regierungsführung gegenübersteht. Dies ist auch eine große Herausforderung für die Regierungsfähigkeit Pekings.

      Grundsätzlich lassen sich die Steuerungsinstrumente des Staates in zwei Kategorien einteilen: Gesetz und Moral. Das Gesetz legt jedoch nur ein Mindestmaß sozialer Ordnung fest und zielt nicht darauf ab, die Wertvorstellungen der Gesellschaft effektiv zu lenken. Obwohl Moral eine subtile und normative Wirkung auf die Gesellschaft hat, ist sie nur eine weiche Einschränkung und ihre Durchsetzungskraft und Abschreckungskraft sind unzureichend. Daher haben sowohl das Gesetz als auch die Moral ihre Grenzen. Aufgrund der zahlreichen Einschränkungen des politischen Systems ist China von einer Rechtsstaatlichkeit noch weit entfernt. Die rasche Zunahme der Mobilität der Bevölkerung führt zum Zerfall der traditionellen sozialen Kontrolle durch Bekanntschaft, was dazu führt, dass die Ehrfurcht vor der traditionellen Moral nicht mehr besteht. Die endlosen sozialen Probleme und die sich verschärfenden sozialen Widersprüche haben Peking dazu gezwungen, neben Gesetz und Moral neue und mächtigere Regierungsmethoden zu finden, um mit der neuen Situation nach dem Zusammenbruch des Danwei-Systems und des Hukou-Systems umzugehen.

      Dem vor diesem Hintergrund entstandenen Sozialkreditsystem wurde daher von Peking große Bedeutung beigemessen. Als eine andere Art normativer Macht jenseits von Gesetz und Moral entsteht soziale Kredit durch das tägliche Handeln der Mitglieder der Gesellschaft. Soziale Kredit spiegelt genau das Leben und das moralische Handeln des einfachen Menschen wieder. Durch den Aufbau eines Systems zum Erfassen von Vertrauenswürdigkeit, der Motivation zu vertrauenswürdigem Handeln, der Maßregelungen von Vertrauensbrüchen und der Verknüpfung dieser Maßnahmen mit dem Leben der einzelnen Menschen kann soziale Kredit effizient die Kosten der Kooperation zwischen den Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft verringern und die Moral der Gesellschaft verbessern. Dadurch wird ein Mechanismus zur Selbstregulierung geschaffen, der die Mitglieder der Gesellschaft stark bindet. Diese Mechanismen bilden das soziale Kreditssystem und werden zu einem idealen Instrument für Steuerung und Kontrolle gegenüber der gesamten Gesellschaft.

      Große technologische Fortschritte wie Big Data, Cloud-Computing und Künstliche Intelligenz haben es außerdem ermöglicht, dass das soziale Kreditssystem, das massive Informationsmengen verarbeiten muss, erstmals technisch machbar wird. Die chinesische Regierung hat eine enorme Macht, beherrscht riesige politische und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen und zeigt einen starken politischen Willen, was das soziale Kreditsystem in China der Realität näher bringt.

      2. Entwicklung

      Das Sozialkreditsystemprogramm der chinesischen Regierung ist heute das größte Experiment der sozialen Kontrolle der Welt. Das Programm ist jedoch nicht so sehr das Ergebnis eines Top-Level-Designs von Peking, sondern ist vielmehr das Ergebnis häufiger gesellschaftlicher Vertrauenskrisen, sozialer Konflikte und der daraus resultierenden Regierungsherausforderungen. Das Sozialkreditsystemprogramm wurde nicht über Nacht beschlossen, sondern durchlief folgende Entwicklungsstufen:

      Die erste Stufe: die Keimphase (1990-2001)

      Die ursprüngliche Aufmerksamkeit der chinesischen Regierung in Bezug auf gesellschaftliche Vertrauenswürdigkeit geht auf das Problem der Dreiecksverschuldung in den 1990er Jahren zurück. Im März 1990 verkündete der Staatsrat die „Bekanntmachung über die Durchführung der Abrechnung der ‚Dreiecksverschuldung‘ im ganzen Land“ , die den Beginn markierte, dass die chinesische Regierung und die chinesischen Unternehmen die extreme Bedeutung von Vertrauenswürdigkeit in der Marktwirtschaft erkannten.

      Gleichzeitig entwickelten sich Kreditsdienstleistungen. Ende 1992 wurde Beijing Xinhuaxin Business Risk Management Co., Ltd. gegründet, das erste Unternehmen, das sich auf Unternehmenskreditsuntersuchungen spezialisierte. Seitdem sind nacheinander eine Reihe von professionellen Agenturen für Kreditsermittlung entstanden. Im Jahr 1997 führte Shanghai einen Test für persönliche Kreditsprüfungen durch. Im Jahr 1999 wurde Shanghai Credit Information Co., Ltd. gegründet und begann, sich mit Kreditprüfungen für Einzelpersonen und Unternehmen zu beschäftigen. Ende des Jahres wurde das System zur Registrierung und Beratung von Bankkrediten in Betrieb genommen.

      Dies war die Zeit des Aufkeimens des Aufbaus des chinesischen Sozialkreditsystems. Es wurden einige Kreditsprüfungsunternehmen gegründet. Diese waren jedoch begrenzt auf das Ministerium für internationale Wirtschaft und Handel, auf die Zentralbank und einzelne Regionen wie Shanghai. Es gab keine landesweite einheitliche Planung und Umsetzung.

      Die zweite Phase: die Startperiode (2001-2007)

      Ausgehend vom Finanzsektor begann der Aufbau von Vertrauenswürdigkeit. Im Jahr 2006 richtete die Zentralbank (People's Bank of China, PBoC) eine nationale Datenbank für Unternehmens- und persönliche Kreditsinformationen ein. Obwohl diese Datenbank über nur begrenzten Umfang und Funktionen verfügte, hat sie einen Präzedenzfall für den Aufbau eines Kreditsystems geschaffen, das von der Regierung geleitet, landesweit vernetzt, zentralisiert und einheitlich verwaltet wird. In diesem Jahr erstellte das System Kreditsakten für mehr als 16 Millionen Unternehmen und 650 Millionen natürliche Personen, realisierte den Austausch von Kreditsinformationen der Kreditnehmer unter kommerziellen Banken und stellte Beratungsdienste für Justiz- und Verwaltungsbehörden zur Verfügung.

      In dieser Zeit beschleunigten verschiedene Sektoren und Regierungsbehörden den Aufbau von Kreditsinformationssystemen. So setzten beispielsweise die nationale Industrie- und Handelsverwaltung, die allgemeine Zollverwaltung und die allgemeine Verwaltung für Qualitätsüberwachung, Inspektion und Quarantäne etc. auf die Projekte „Jinxin“, „Jinguan“ und „Jinzhi“, um den Aufbau von Kreditsinformationssystemen jeweiliger Zuständigkeit zu fördern. Die Wertpapierbranche, die Versicherungsbranche, die Expresszustellungsbranche und andere Industrien haben auch begonnen, auf Kreditsüberprüfungen zu achten und Kreditsinformationssysteme aufzubauen

      Gleichzeitig haben einige lokale Regierungen bestimmte Erkundungen beim Aufbau von Vertrauenswürdigkeit anhand der tatsächlichen Situation in der Region durchgeführt und versucht, den Aufbau von Vertrauenswürdigkeit vor Ort zu etablieren und zu fördern. Bis Ende 2007 hatten 15 Provinzen (autonome Regionen und regierungsunmittelbare Städte) 18 lokale Gesetze und Vorschriften für Kreditsinformationen erlassen.

      Die dritte Stufe: die Phase der Systematisierung des Aufbaus von Vertrauenswürdigkeit (2007-2014)

      Mit der Aufmerksamkeit auf dem Aufbau von sozialer Kredit hat die chinesische Regierung begonnen, auf der obersten Ebene Untersuchungen durchzuführen. Im März 2007 veröffentlichte das Generalbüro des Staatsrates „Mehrere Stellungnahmen zum Aufbau des Sozialkreditsystems“, welche das damalige Sozialkreditsystem anhand der Aspekte der Formulierung von Plänen, der Verbesserung der Vorschriften, der Förderung des Informationsaustausches und des Aufbaus einer einheitlichen Kreditsinformationsplattform für die Finanzindustrie klärte. Außerdem wurden sowohl der Arbeitsschwerpunkt und die Arbeitsteilung festgelegt, als auch der Arbeitsmechanismus der interministeriellen Tagung eingerichtet, um den Aufbau des Sozialkreditsystems zu lenken und zu fördern.

      Die multisektorale gemeinsame Beteiligung, die Förderung des Informationsaustauschs und die einheitliche Informationsplattform waren die Schwerpunkte beim Aufbau von sozialer Kredit in dieser Zeit. Das heißt, die ursprünglich verstreute Kreditskonstruktion begann sich in Richtung „Systematisierung“ zu bewegen. Insbesondere die Beteiligung von Personal- und Sozialversicherungsbehörden, zivilgesellschaftlichen Behörden, Transport- und Informationsmanagementbehörden hat den Aufbau eines Sozialkreditsystems zu einer starken nationalen Politik gemacht und damit einen großen Sprung in Richtung „Systematisierung“ gemacht.

      Die vierte Stufe: Die Aufwertung des Sozialkreditsystems zu einer wichtigen Strategie auf nationaler Ebene (2014 bis heute)

      Im Juni 2014 veröffentlichte der Staatsrat die „Planungsübersicht über den Aufbau des Sozialkreditsystems (2014-2020)“, in der er die Beschleunigung des Aufbaus des Sozialkreditsystems betont und festlegt, um ein nationales Sozialkreditsystem bis 2020 einzurichten . Anschließend beschloss die interministerielle Konferenz gemeinsam, eine Aufgabenteilung zur Umsetzung dieser Planung auf Ministerebene durchzuführen, um die Implementierung dieses Großprojekts zu beschleunigen. Entsprechend den Anforderungen der Planung fördert die Nationale Entwicklungs- und Reformkommission und die People's Bank of China lokale Pilotprojekte. Seit 2015 wurden insgesamt 43 Pilotprojekte gestartet. Zu Beginn des Jahres 2018 wählte die Nationale Entwicklungs- und Reformkommission und die People's Bank of China zwölf Modellstädte aus, nämlich Hangzhou, Nanjing, Xiamen, Chengdu, Suzhou, Suqian, Huizhou, Wenzhou, Weihai, Weifang, Yiwu und Rongcheng.

      Neben den staatlich geführten Pilotprojekten sind auch einige private Unternehmen in das Sozialkreditsystem eingegliedert. Im Januar 2015 genehmigte die People's Bank of China acht privaten Unternehmen, sich auf das Einsenden der persönlichen Kreditsinformationen vorzubereiten, darunter Sesame Credit, Tencent Credit und Qianhai Credit. Im Januar 2018 gab die Zentralbank jedoch bekannt, dass die acht Unternehmen eine große Lücke zur Marktnachfrage und den regulatorischen Anforderungen aufwiesen und daher keine Lizenz ausgestellt werde. Eine neue Firma - Baihang Credit, die gemeinsam von China Internet Finance Association und diesen acht Unternehmen gegründet wurde, erhielt Anfang 2018 eine dreijährige Lizenz für persönliche Kreditüberprüfung.

      3. Perspektiven

      Anfang 2018 veröffentlichte die Website Credit China die Aussichten auf den Ausbau des sozialen Kreditssystems Chinas, die von einer Reihe namhafter chinesischer Kreditsdienstleistungsagenturen sowie einiger Experten und Gelehrten zusammengefasst wurden:

      Ausblick 1: Es wird erwartet, dass die Gesetzgebung einen Durchbruch erzielen wird

      Auf lokaler Ebene wurden in fünf Provinzen lokale Gesetze in Bezug auf das Kreditsystem verabschiedet, darunter Shaanxi, Hubei, Shanghai, Hebei und Zhejiang. Auf nationaler Ebene wurden die Entwürfe für ein Kreditsgesetz, Regelungen zur Verwaltung der Informationen der öffentlichen Krediten und einheitliche Kreditscodes ausgearbeitet und in den Nationalen Volkskongress einbezogen.

      Ausblick 2: Es wird erwartet, dass das System der Standards sozialer Kredit rasch voranschreitet

      Seit der Einrichtung der Nationalen Kommission für die Standardisierung von sozialer Kredit im Juli 2016 hat sich der Aufbau von Kreditsstandards rasant entwickelt. Bisher hat China mehr als 30 nationale Kreditsstandards erlassen und mehr als 20 nationale Standards sind fortlaufend.

      Ausblick 3 : Der Aufbau des Branchenkreditssystems wird dazu beitragen, die effektive Überwachung des Marktes zu fördern

      Im Jahr 2017 veröffentlichte die Nationale Entwicklungs- und Reformkommission ein Schreiben zur Einführung von Drittanbietern für Kreditdienstleistungen, woraufhin sich mehr als 50 Institute angemeldet haben. Im Jahr 2018 wird sich eine Reihe von Agenturen für Kreditdienstleistungen intensiv am Aufbau von Kredit in 34 Sektoren beteiligen, darunter Werbung, Regierungsangelegenheiten, Finanzen, Bikesharing, Tourismus, Bildung und Umweltschutz.

      Ausblick 4: Das gemeinsame Memorandum über Belohnung und Bestrafung wird die vollständige Abdeckung der Schlüsselbereiche erreichen

      Anreize und Strafen spielen als Kernmechanismus beim Aufbau des Sozialkreditsystems eine immer wichtigere Rolle. Bisher wurden mehr als 30 gemeinsame Memoranden von der Nationalen Entwicklungs- und Reformkommission und den zuständigen Regierungsbehörden unterzeichnet. Mit der Verbreitung des Sozialkreditsystems werden die Anreize für Vertrauenswürdigkeit und die Bestrafung von nicht vertrauenswürdigen Personen die vollständige Abdeckung der Schlüsselbereiche erreichen.

      Ausblick 5: Das einheitliche System für soziale Kreditscodes befindet sich in der Phase der finalen Implementierung und Anwendung

      Im Jahr 2017 wurde die Reform des einheitlichen Systems für Kreditscodes im Wesentlichen abgeschlossen. Im Jahr 2018 wird erwartet, dass allen juristischen Personen, allen Geschäftshaushalten und anderen sozialen Organisationen vollständig einem einheitlichen System des Kreditscodes zugeordnet werden. Der einheitliche Kreditscode dient zur eindeutigen Identifikation verschiedener sozialer Akteure und spielt eine wichtige grundlegende Rolle bei der Förderung der Sammlung von Kreditsdaten und ihrer Anwendung.

      Ausblick 6: Der Mechanismus für persönliche Kreditsaufzeichnungen in wichtigen Bereichen wird sich beschleunigen

      Es wird erwartet, dass der Aufbau der persönlichen Kredit auf die Tagesordnung gesetzt wird. Gemäß den „Leitlinien des Generalbüros des Staatsrates zur Stärkung des Aufbaus des Systems für die persönliche Kredit“ wird erwartet, dass sich der Mechanismus für die Registrierung persönlicher Kredit in wichtigen Bereichen beschleunigt.

      Ausblick 7: Wiederherstellung von Kredit und Verbreitung von Informationen über Kredit werden zur Normalität

      Mit der Einführung eines Systems von schwarzen Listen wird sich schnell ein Bestrafungsmechanismus entwickeln, der nach dem Prinzip funktioniert, dass „wer an einer Stelle nicht vertrauenswürdig ist, überall auf Grenzen stoßen wird“. Daher wird die Wiederherstellung der Kredit zu einer wirksamen Maßnahme zur Korrektur des nicht vertrauenswürdigen Verhaltens. Um Wiederherstellung von Kredit durchführen zu können, müssen alle Regierungsbehörden und Regionen die Informationsverbreitung und die Bildung in dem Bereich verstärken.

      Ausblick 8: Die Verwendung von Kreditsinformationen und Kreditsprodukten wird zum entscheidendem Faktor im Wettbewerb der Kreditsdienstleister

      Im Jahr 2017 unterzeichneten das nationale Informationszentrum und einige dritte Kreditsdienstleistungsagenturen die „Absichtserklärung zur Stärkung des Austausches von Kreditinformationen“, wobei der Datenaustausch zwischen externen Kreditsdienstleistern und der Regierung gefördert wird. Mit der Einrichtung des National Public Credit Information Center wird die Sammlung, Verteilung und Veröffentlichung von Kreditsinformationen weiter verstärkt. Das National Public Credit Information Center wurde im Jahr 2018 zu einer wichtigen Datenquelle für Kreditsdienstleistungen von Drittanbietern. Die zentrale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Kreditsdienstleistungsunternehmen liegt in der Anwendung von Kreditsinformationen und der Wirksamkeit von Kreditsprodukten.

      Ausblick 9: Die Qualität und Quantität der Kreditsinformationen werden erheblich verbessert

      Bis Ende 2017 war die nationale Plattform für den Austausch von Kreditsinformationen mit 44 Regierungsbehörden, allen Provinzen sowie über 50 Marktinstitutionen verbunden. Die Anzahl der gesammelten Kreditsinformationen betrug mehr als 13,2 Milliarden. Mit Beginn des Jahres 2018 wird die zweite Phase der nationalen Plattform für den Austausch von Kreditsinformationen eingeleitet. Nach Abschluss des Projekts wird die Sammlung von Kreditsinformationen vielfältiger und die Qualität und die Quantität der Informationen werden erheblich verbessert.

      4. Fazit

      Chinas Plan für das Sozialkreditsystem und sein Aufbau haben weltweit große Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen. Die Akademiker, Medien und Regierungen im Westen sind im Allgemeinen besorgt, dass dieser riesige Plan eine neue Art digitaler Totalitarismus ist, der es Chinas Staatsapparat ermöglichen wird, eine umfassende Überwachung der Gesellschaft und der Bürger durchzuführen. Tatsächlich liegt der Hintergrund von Chinas Sozialkreditsystem in der Umstellung von Planwirtschaft auf Marktwirtschaft. Daher brachen das Danwei-System und das Hukou-System aus der Mao-Ära zusammen, was zu einer ernsthaften Krise des sozialen Vertrauens führte und die chinesische Regierung zwang, neben Gesetz und Moral neue und mächtigere Regierungsmethoden und Regierungsmittel zu finden. Professorin Genia Kostka von der Freien Universität Berlin fand in ihrer Forschung, dass die meisten Chinesen der Notwendigkeit zustimmen, ein Sozialkreditsystem aufzubauen und größeres Vertrauen in den Aufbau eines Sozialkreditsystems durch die Regierung als durch private Unternehmen haben. Ist Chinas soziales Kreditsystem jedoch eine wirksame Lösung für Chinas soziale Vertrauenskrise oder ist es ein mächtiges Instrument für den Staat, eine umfassende Überwachung der Gesellschaft und der Bürger zu implementieren? Das Thema ist nach wie vor kontrovers. Eines ist jedoch sicher, nämlich dass die chinesische Regierung riesige Ressourcen investiert hat, um den Aufbau eines Sozialkreditsystems stetig voranzutreiben, das die chinesische Gesellschaft stark verändern und jeden Bürger betreffen wird.

      5. Literaturverzeichnis

      Credit China信用中国: “2018 nian shehui xinyong tixi jianshe shida zhanwang 2018年社会信用体系建设十大展望[The Top 10 perspectives of the construction of social credit system in China]”, https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/toutiaoxi...104_105598.html, Stand: zuletzt aufgerufen am 19.11.2018

      Kostka, Genia: “China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of Approval”, in: SSRN (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3215138, Stand: zuletzt aufgerufen am 19.11.2018.

      LI Guaiqiong 李乖琼: Zhongguo shehui xionyong tixi yanjiu中国社会信用体系建设研究 [A study on the social credit system of China], M.A. thesis, Party School of the CPC Central Committee, 2016

      NDRC 国家发改委: “Shoupi shehui xinyong tixi jianshe shifan chengshi mindan gongbu 首批社会信用体系建设示范城市名单公布[The list of the first model cities of the construction of social credit system is now published]”, http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201801/...109_873409.html, Stand: zuletzt aufgerufen am 19.11.2018

      XIE Yiqi 谢一奇: Zuowei zhili gongju de shehui xinyong tixi jianshe-dashuju shidai de zhengfu zhili yu zhengqi xietong作为治理工具的社会信用体系建设-大数据时代的政府治理与政企协同 [A study on the social credit system construction under the background of Internet development], M.A. thesis, Nanjing University, 2017

      YU Sinian 俞思念: “A study on the process of the construction of social credit system in China (Woguo shehui xinyong tixi jianshe de jincheng tanjiu我国社会信用体系建设的进程探究)”, in: Tribune of Study学习论坛 32, 2 (2016)

      Staatsrat 国务院: “Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa shehui xinyong tixi jiansheguihua gangyao(2014-2020nian) de tongzhi 国务院关于印发社会信用体系建设规划纲要(2014—2020年)的通知[Planungsübersicht über den Aufbau des Sozialkreditsystems (2014-2020)]”, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-0...ontent_8913.htm, Stand: zuletzt aufgerufen am 19.11.2018

      Staatsrat 国务院: “Guowuyuan guanyu zai quanguo fanwei nei kaizhan qingli sanjiaozai gongzuo de tongzhi 国务院关于在全国范围内开展清理“三角债”工作的通知[Bekanntmachung über die Durchführung der Abrechnung der ‚Dreiecksverschuldung‘ im ganzen Land]”, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2010-1...ontent_2477.htm, Stand: zuletzt aufgerufen am 19.11.2018

      Staatsrat 国务院: “Woguo shehui xinyong tixi jianshe qude zhongyao jinzhan 我国社会信用体系建设取得重要进展[The construction of social credit system of our country has made important progresses]”, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-07/10/content_5305169.htm, Stand: zuletzt aufgerufen am 19.11.2018

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